The Financing of Catastrophe Risk by Christopher Lewis & Kevin C. Murdock
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Financing of Catastrophe Risk
Volume Author/Editor: Kenneth A. Froot, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-26623-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/froo99-1
Publication Date: January 1999
Chapter Title: Alternative Means of Redistributing Catastrophic Risk in a
National Risk-Management System
Chapter Author: Christopher Lewis, Kevin C. Murdock
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7948
Chapter pages in book: (p. 51 - 92)2  Alternative Means of 
Redistributing Catastrophic 
Risk in a National 
Risk-Management System 
Christopher M. Lewis and Kevin C. Murdock 
Since 1989, the costs of  natural disaster have risen dramatically. Combined 
insurance losses from Humcane Andrew ($15.5 billion) and the Northridge 
Earthquake ($12.5 billion) alone totaled almost $30 billion. Insured and unin- 
sured losses from these two events exceeded $40 billion. In fact, after adjusting 
for housing-price inflation, insured losses over the period 1989-95 totaled al- 
most $75 billion, more than five times the average real insured losses during 
the prior four decades.’ 
The years 1989-95  by no means represent an unusual period of heightened 
disaster activity; new research shows that society’s exposure to disaster risk is 
far greater than  previously  recognized.  During  1995, more tropical  storms 
were formed (nineteen) than at any time since 1933, foreshadowing a return to 
the higher tropical storm activity patterns experienced earlier this century (IS0 
1996).*  At the same time, geologic studies of earthquake recurrence intervals 
in the United States indicate that there is a very high probability of another 
Northridge-magnitude or larger earthquake occurring during the next decade. 
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1. Based on “PCS Catastrophe History Database,” version 1.3, Property Claims Services, ad- 
justed for housing-price inflation using owner-occupied housing-value information from the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Ser. HC80-LA. 
2. Most of these storms did not make landfall, but those that did contributed to the $8.5 billion 
in total insured catastrophe losses for 1995 (IS0 1996). 
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More significantly, the value of properties exposed to natural disaster risk 
has increased rapidly. From  1970 to 1990, the population density along the 
Southeast Atlantic Coast increased by  nearly 75 percent, far in excess of the 
20 percent increase experienced for the nation as a whole (IS0 1994). More 
troubling, insured coastal property values in the United States grew 69 percent 
from 1988 to 1993 to $3.15 trillion. Similarly, the average annual growth rates 
in the population per square foot in California (2 percent) and Florida (3.2 
percent) over the past fifteen years have been double and triple the average 
national growth rate for the whole United States (US.  Bureau of the Census 
1  994). 
This  increased  recognition  of  disaster  exposure has  sent  reverberations 
throughout the private-sector financial markets. In Florida, computer models 
of hurricane risk were reporting expected average annual hurricane losses of 
$1.4-$1.5  billion relative to total homeowner’s premiums of just $1.2 billion 
(premiums earned on related lines totaled another $1.2 billion). In California, 
average annual earthquake exposures were quickly approaching  $1 billion, 
compared with industry premiums of just $524 million (Insurance Information 
Institute 1994). 
Reinsurance  companies responded  to this increased  exposure quickly by 
raising rates. According to a study by Goldman Sachs, the average rate on line 
(ROL) for catastrophe covers jumped from 7.93 to 15.09  percent between 1985 
and 1995, while the average attachment point for a single catastrophe increased 
from $1.14 to $2.57 billion in industry losses (Litzenberger, Beaglehole, and 
Reynolds 1996). Discussions with insurance-company executives indicate that 
reinsurance rates increased by as much as 150 percent from 1993 to 1995. 
With a rise in reinsurance rates, an increased catastrophe-exposure retention, 
and a realization of their overexposure to disaster risk, primary insurers sought 
comparable rate  increases.  When  these  rate-increase  proposals  were  pared 
down in the process of state insurance rate approval, insurers started to with- 
draw from the market, causing a drop in the availability of insurance coverage 
for individuals living in high-risk areas of the country. In response, states insti- 
tuted new regulations restricting insurer exits, established new state insurance 
facilities, and approved modest increases in primary-insurance rates. The net 
result, however, was a continued overexposure of insurance companies to natu- 
ral disaster risk. Similar disruptions occurred after the Northridge Earthquake. 
The concern over natural disaster expenditures after Hurricane Andrew was 
not limited to the insurance industry. In 1994, the U.S. Congress raised con- 
cerns over the growth in long-term disaster-recovery expenses incurred by the 
federal government. Thus, at the same time as the insurance industry started 
seeking federal assistance  in  reducing  its catastrophe exposure, the federal 
government  was  concerned  with  the  budgetary  implications  of  disaster- 
recovery expenses that were already being incurred. 
As a result, homeowners, insurers, financial markets, and state and federal 
governments have started evaluating options for improving society’s ability to 53  Catastrophic Risk Management 
finance disaster risk: New state programs have been developed in Florida (the 
Florida Catastrophe Fund), California (the California Earthquake Authority), 
and Hawaii to increase insurer capacity in these high-risk markets. New finan- 
cial market instruments have been developed to help insurers hedge natural 
disaster risk (e.g., catastrophe options at the Chicago Board of Trade, surplus 
notes, and act-of-God bonds). An insurance swap market (CATEX, the Catas- 
trophe Risk Exchange) has been developed to allow for enhanced geographic 
diversification of disaster risk. Finally, a federal excess-of-loss reinsurance pro- 
gram has been proposed to better diversify claims intertemporally. 
These efforts to devise alternative means of financing disaster risk represent 
attempts to address the primary question gripping the U.S. economy with re- 
spect to catastrophic risk: How can catastrophic risk be more efficiently man- 
aged? This paper examines the current distribution of catastrophic risk in the 
United States and presents a general public-policy framework for evaluating 
the role that federal policy can play in improving this allocation of disaster 
risk. Within this framework, this paper then evaluates two major federal disas- 
ter reform initiatives. 
First, the paper analyzes why a requirement for the purchase of natural di- 
saster insurance on new structures could be an effective mechanism for reduc- 
ing total societal losses from natural disasters. Currently, the system for al- 
locating  natural disaster  risk  in the  United  States is inefficient and allows 
individual propertyowners to ignore their disaster-risk exposure when making 
construction decisions-promoting  inefficient construction location and de- 
sign. A requirement for the purchase of all-hazards insurance on new construc- 
tion could help promote more efficient construction and reduce the incentives 
for moving to high-risk areas of the country, mitigating the costs of future di- 
sasters. 
Second, this paper suggests that the creation of a new financial instrument 
(an industry excess-of-loss contract) could provide the insurance industry with 
an important tool for intertemporally diversifying natural disaster risk. Inter- 
temporal diversification is an important component of disaster-loss financing 
given the large variance in aggregate disaster claims and the large differentials 
between annual premium volume and annual disaster losses. This type of risk 
can often be best hedged through market-based securities. Hence, the paper 
also suggests that having the federal government provide the initial liquidity 
for the market (with sufficient mechanisms for the private sector to “crowd 
out” the public sector) could allow insurance and reinsurance companies to 
make the necessary investments in business systems to support this new mar- 
ket. The creation of this new mechanism would likely promote a gradual transi- 
tion to a more efficient risk-allocation mechanism for natural disasters where 
insurance companies and reinsurance companies are able to better pool risks 
geographically  and intertemporal  risk  is managed  through  private market- 
based mechanisms. 
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risk in the United States. Section 2.2 highlights some of the weaknesses within 
the current system that have given rise to the disruption in insurance markets 
following the recent rise in disaster activity. A framework for analyzing federal 
policy options for addressing these weaknesses is discussed in section 2.3. Sec- 
tion 2.4 applies this framework in analyzing two specific policy options de- 
signed to improve the management of disaster risk in the United States. A con- 
clusion follows. 
2.1  Financing Natural Disaster Risk 
In the aggregate, all losses from natural disasters are paid out of individual 
incomes, through either direct losses, insurance premiums, losses on insurance 
stocks, charity, or taxes. However, the magnitude of future disaster losses de- 
pends on the level of ex ante disaster mitigation, and these mitigation invest- 
ments, in turn, depend on the manner in which disaster risks are allocated and 
financed. The primary objective of natural disaster policy is to reduce the effect 
on welfare of a given disaster event. This paper focuses on how the choice of 
ex ante financing mechanisms for disaster risk can directly affect the size of 
the welfare loss associated with natural disasters within a context of disaster- 
risk management. 
2.1.1  Recent History 
Historically, losses from natural disasters have been financed using one of 
six mechanisms: private insurance, capital market securities, federal taxpayer 
assistance,  state  taxpayer  assistance,  self-insurance,  or  charity.  Figure  2.1 
shows the allocation of  financing sources (excluding  self-insurance) for the 
two largest disaster events in the United  States: Hurricane Andrew  and the 
Northridge Earthquake. The allocation of disaster expenditures differs signif- 
icantly between the two events.  For example,  as ground-movement events, 
earthquakes tend to cause far more extensive damage to infrastructure than do 
humcanes. As such, government  assistance for infrastructure reconstruction 
tends to cover a larger percentage of earthquake losses. Also, hurricanes can 
create far greater damage from flooding,  leading  to a larger percentage  of 
losses being covered through the federal flood-insurance program. (The largest 
percentage of losses from Hurricane Hugo came from flood damage.) Finally, 
since only 35-40  percent of Californians carried earthquake-insurance cover- 
age, a smaller portion of personal property losses in Northridge was covered 
by  insurance,  shifting  more losses to individuals,  taxpayer  assistance, and, 
where the loss of property  value resulted in a mortgage default, investors in 
mortgage securities. 
Figure 2.1 also shows the magnitude of cross-subsidization  of disaster risk 
from low-risk to high-risk areas. In the case of state taxpayer assistance, cross- 
subsidies exist between low-risk and high-risk properties within the state. At 
the federal level, cross-subsidies are broader, with taxpayers in low-risk states 55  Catastrophic Risk Management 
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Fig. 2.1  Allocation of financing sources: A, Hurricane Andrew ($18 billion); 
B, Northridge Earthquake ($23 billion) 
paying for losses in disaster-prone areas. To the extent that the federal or state 
governments borrow to cover disaster expenditures, disaster risk is also cross- 
subsidized intertemporally. Charity obviously represents a direct transfer from 
nonaffected parties to those who experienced a disaster loss. 
In the case of purchased insurance and capital market instruments, however, 
the risk of loss should be incorporated in the purchase price of  the coverage 
provided (assuming that the price of the instrument is efficient).3  As such, the 
risk is internalized in the purchase decision. In the case of self-insurance, the 
degree of  internalization is unclear. However, the buildup of property values 
in disaster-prone areas of the country and the lack of disaster-mitigation invest- 
ment in these areas suggest an underrecognition of risk internalization. 
Experience over the last six years has demonstrated that traditional channels 
3. To the extent that state insurance commissioners impose price ceilings on insurance rates, the 
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for financing disaster losses are adequate to cover losses of the magnitude of 
$10-$20  billion, but only with disruption in the market for disaster insurance 
and rapid increases in federal and state disaster spending. Fueling congres- 
sional and industry concerns is a recognition that, as disaster losses start to 
exceed $30-40  billion, the functioning of the entire insurance system may be 
at risk. While the probability of such an event occurring is relative small-1-2 
percent according to some estimates (Cummins, Lewis, and Phillips, chap. 3 
in this volume)-it  is important to examine this contingency. 
2.1.2  Efficient Market Allocation of Disaster Risk 
The question of how to allocate disaster risks most efficiently is best under- 
stood by first examining the simple case in which all individuals have perfect 
knowledge concerning the joint distribution of claim amounts and others' atti- 
tudes toward risk. The basic theory for understanding the markets for risk bear- 
ing was initially developed by Arrow (1953, 1964) and Debreu (1959), with a 
specific extension to insurance markets by Borch (1974). Even after twenty- 
five years of advances in the theory of insurance and capital markets, the most 
fundamental propositions of these papers offer insights into the problem of 
managing catastrophic risk. 
As concisely demonstrated in Lemaire's (1990) summary of Borchs theo- 
rem and in Arrow (1996), the basic risk-exchange model starts with a set of N 
individuals in the economy N = {cl,  . . . ,cn},  each with an initial wealth of wz 
and subject to a risk of loss characterized by distribution function F,(x,). Then, 
assuming that each individual possesses a utility function u,(x,) such that u,!(x) 
>  0 and u,!(x) < 0 (diminishing marginal utility), the expected utility of c,'s  ex 
ante position is defined by 
where  represents the probability that the state of the world xj  will occur. To 
maximize their ex ante utility, the n individuals will then enter into risk-sharing 
transactions to form a risk pool defined by 
where y,(x,, . . . ,xn) = y([x])  is the sum that agent cj has to pay if the claims 
for the different agents respectively amount to x,, . . .  J,.  Then, assuming that 
the market clears (a closed exchange), 
(3) 
"  "  C  yj([x])  =  C  x,  =  total amount of all claims. 
j=l  /=I 
Both Lemaire (1990) and Arrow (1996) show that, under mild assumptions, 
the Pareto-optimal risk-sharing treaty among the individuals depends only on 
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(1  996) concludes, the probability-adjusted price for obtaining a wealth transfer 
contingent on the realization of a given state of the world depends only on the 
total of all endowments available in that state of the world, not on the wealth 
effect on the insured indi~idual.~ 
Thus, in efficient Arrow-Debreu markets with perfect information, individu- 
als can manage their exposure to contingent disaster liabilities by taking (long 
and short) positions in state-contingent risk-exchange securities. That is, indi- 
viduals agree to enter into state-contingent risk-shifting contracts that allocate 
wealth from individuals who benefit from the realization of a specific state of 
the world to individuals who would suffer disaster losses in that state of  the 
world. Thus, to construct a Pareto-optimal risk-sharing arrangement, agents 
simply need to form a pool of all claims and specify a formula for distributing 
the burden of  such claims, independent of  their origin (Lemaire 1990). This 
observation, which  Debreu  extended  into  a  multigood,  multiperiod  model, 
launched an enormous body of research dedicated to specifying the optimal 
pool risk-sharing formulas for various risk preferences, utility-curve represen- 
tations, individual versus collective rationality, and market structure (Lemaire 
1990). 
The efficiency of the Arrow-Debreu solution centers on the ability of indi- 
viduals to share perfect knowledge over the probabilistic outcomes associated 
with future states of  the world. As a result,  through the operation of a price 
system, individuals can obtain an efficient ex ante allocation of risk bearing. 
While an efficient allocation of risk bearing does not eliminate the losses asso- 
ciated with a natural disaster, it makes the losses to society as small as possible. 
Of course, even in the Arrow-Debreu world, as the size of  the disaster loss 
increases and the state-contingent endowments fall, the market for transfer 
payments decreases. Thus, for perfectly correlated catastrophic disaster events 
that  universally  affect  society, the  extent  of  transfer payments  is relatively 
small. 
Unfortunately, an examination of the market for risk bearing in the United 
States demonstrates that the conditions posed by the Arrow-Debreu model of 
allocating risk do not hold in today’s markets. Instead, several real-world inef- 
ficiencies restrict  the ability of the market for risk bearing to function effi- 
ciently. First of all, individuals do not have access to perfect information con- 
cerning their disaster-risk exposure. As a result, individuals cannot internalize 
an accurate assessment  of  their risk exposure in their decisions to purchase 
insurance or mitigate hazard losses (Kunreuther 1996). 
Second, the process of managing individual insurance contracts entails con- 
siderable  administrative  costs  associated  with  evaluating  risks,  processing 
claims, and monitoring risk (Epstein 1996). In addition, insurance must con- 
tend with the ability of  the insured to influence his or her endowment (and 
4. Thus, for two states with the same total of  endowments, the prices (premiums) of payments 
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therefore the endowments of others through risk-shifting) in future states of the 
world without being observed. This ability to shift risk is the classic problem 
of  moral hazard that introduces inefficiencies  into the competitive insurance 
equilibrium (Arnott and Stiglitz 1990). Finally, the existence of ex post gov- 
ernment  subsidies imposes  inefficiencies  and disincentives for risk  sharing 
(Priest 1996). 
We now turn to a discussion of these factors to gain a better understanding 
of how  risks currently are allocated in the U.S.  economy. After examining 
problems associated with the process of internalizing risks at the individual 
level, we focus on the structure of existing mechanisms for risk financing. Fi- 
nally, we demonstrate where the existing systems for financing disaster risks 
break down. 
2.1.3 
Associated with every property or structure in the United States is a proba- 
bility of loss due to a natural disaster. Knowingly or unknowingly, buyers im- 
plicitly accept this liability to disaster risk when they build or purchase prop- 
erty. The value of this liability is given by  a disaster-loss distribution derived 
from the product of two probability distributions-the  probabilities of disaster 
occurrences on the property in question and the conditional distribution of loss 
severities associated with those disaster occurrences. 
In  a world  of  perfect  information  and efficient  markets,  propertyowners 
would  accurately value  the disaster liability  associated with  a property. As 
such, propertyowners could assess (a) the relative value of properties with or 
without the disaster liability included in the offer price, (b)  how the risk of loss 
to a particular property can be reduced through mitigation actions (i.e., actions 
that lower disaster severities), and (c) the net benefits of alternative means of 
financing the losses that do occur. Essentially, propertyowners would recognize 
that they hold a long position in natural disaster risk and would incorporate the 
value of this exposure in their utility-maximization process-utilizing  actions 
to reduce their disaster exposure when it proves a value-enhancing option. 
First, mitigation measures that pass a benefithost test from the market’s per- 
spective-not  just the individual’s assessment-will  be undertaken. When cal- 
culating the benefits derived from a mitigation  action, propertyowners would 
incorporate the flow of benefits during and after their tenure of ownership since 
the value of all benefits would be reflected in the market price of the property. 
Of course, if mitigation generates positive  externalities  not captured in  the 
market price, the socially optimal level of mitigation may still exceed the mar- 
ket’s valuation of mitigation. 
Also, propertyowners would have an incentive to purchase insurance to re- 
duce their risk  of  loss from a disaster. By purchasing  insurance, property- 
owners can short a portion of their disaster risk exposure in exchange for a pre- 
mium that, because of the diversification benefits offered by insurance, should 
be less than the value of continuing to hold the full position in disaster risk. 
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Finally, prospective propertyowners would incorporate the (negative) value 
of the disaster liability into the price that they are willing to pay for new prop- 
erty, increasing the return to lower-risk properties, and reducing the incentives 
for building new properties in disaster-prone areas. 
Unfortunately, propertyowners do not appear to have a good assessment of 
their relative disaster exposure, and many individuals invest little in protective 
actions to reduce their exposure to disaster risk. In essence, propertyowners 
are not internalizing their risk of exposure in their decisions governing where 
they live, the extent of mitigation investment undertaken, or the decision to 
purchase insurance. 
Kunreuther (1996) cites two possible reasons for this lack of investment- 
an underestimation of  exposure to loss and high personal discount rates in 
valuing the benefits of disaster mitigation, possibly reflecting the attitude that 
“it won’t happen to me.” First, underestimating the value of the contingent di- 
saster liability will create a disconnect between the price of insurance required 
by an insurer properly valuing the exposure of the property and the price the 
propertyowner is willing to pay. This disconnect will reduce the likelihood that 
the propertyowner will finance disaster losses through the purchase of insur- 
ance. Furthermore, understating the value of the disaster risk may  raise the 
benefitkost threshold for mitigation actions by understating the absolute re- 
duction in loss associated with a given mitigation activity. Also, above-market 
personal discount rates reduce the present value of benefits derived from miti- 
gation relative to the up-front cost incurred, reducing the likelihood that miti- 
gation actions would be undertaken. 
Another possible factor creating  an  underinvestment in mitigation  is the 
large differential between the expected arrival time of disaster events and the 
expected length of ownership tenure for properties. If propertyowners incorpo- 
rate only the value of benefits generated over the expected length of ownership 
tenure (six to seven years for homes based on a mobility rate of  10 percent per 
year), and if  the residual benefits are not incorporated into the market price 
of the property, then propertyowners would have a disincentive to undertake 
potentially beneficial mitigation efforts that accrue benefits over a longer pe- 
riod of time. 
On the other hand, it does appear that homeowners are willing to incorporate 
disaster risk into their calculations if given appropriate information on disaster 
risk. In a survey of Florida homeowners, the Institute for Property Loss Reduc- 
tion found that nine of ten homeowners in coastal areas were willing to pay as 
much as $5,000 (or 5 percent) more for a house built to withstand hurricane 
damage (IPLR 1995). In fact, 91 percent of homeowners supported a require- 
ment that builders follow stricter building codes to make dwellings less vul- 
nerable to hurricane damage. At the same time, only 29 percent expressed a 
willingness to retrofit their existing homes if the cost exceeded $2,000, with 
another  18 percent  indicating  a  willingness  to  spend  between  $1,000  and 
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Furthermore, Bernknopf, Brookshire, and Thayer (1990) studied the effect 
on property values of posting information on the relative threat of earthquake 
and volcano damage in the area of Mammoth Lakes, California. Their study 
showed that, while recreational visitation was largely unaffected by the posting 
of new information on the area’s disaster exposure, the information created a 
significant and persistent drop in the value of properties in the region. Thus, 
the important question that must be addressed is whether individuals simply 
lack access to adequate data on their disaster exposure or simply do not incor- 
porate this information into their decisions on where to live, how much insur- 
ance to purchase, and what level of mitigation to undertake. 
2.1.4  Private Market Mechanisms for Financing Disaster Risk 
Arrow-Debreu  markets  provide  a  context  for  viewing  an  “ideal”  risk- 
exchange economy in which individuals, armed with perfect information, can 
purchase pure state-contingent securities that pay the holder after the realiza- 
tion of  a particular  state of  the world and otherwise pay  nothing. Once the 
assumptions of perfect and shared information are relaxed, however, one must 
contend with the difficulties involved in diversifying individual risks in an 
economy with transactions costs. At this point, the economic role of financial 
intermediaries as low-cost transactors in the financial markets becomes central. 
Currently, there are two principal methods of undertaking the financial inter- 
mediation of risk in today’s financial markets-the  purchase of private insur- 
ance and the trading of  market-based securities. 
The Role of  Securities Markets in Diversibing Claims 
Individuals living in a classic Arrow-Debreu world can purchase pure state- 
contingent securities that pay the holder only on the realization of a specified 
state of the world. In cases where the information about the underlying risk- 
generating process of an asset is public (or at least not asymmetrically distrib- 
uted), today’s securities markets function as an efficient niechanism for diver- 
sifying risks very much in the spirit of  the Arrow-Debreu model. Securities 
markets  in  the  United  States  are  highly  liquid,  quickly  incorporate  new 
information  in  the value of  securities,  and have relatively low transactions 
costs. 
Advances in the theory of  derivatives over the past twenty-five years have 
reinforced the ability of  the capital markets to optimize the allocation of  fi- 
nancial resources in the economy. In 1973, Black and Scholes (1973) and Mer- 
ton (1973) developed the general theory of options pricing for derivative secu- 
rities-allowing  for the valuation of  untraded  assets whose payoffs were a 
function of traded assets. A few years later, Ross (1976), Hakansson (1976), 
Banz and Miller (1978), and Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) linked this the- 
ory of options pricing to the Arrow-Debreu world of state-contingent securities 
by demonstrating that portfolios of options can be used to replicate pure securi- 
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(Merton 1990). Thus, in a world of no transactions costs, investors could effi- 
ciently diversify their risks by  constructing optimal portfolios of derivative 
securities. 
Once transactions costs are introduced, however, the role of low-cost finan- 
cial intermediaries becomes important. Financial intermediaries are needed to 
provide individuals with financial instruments that cannot be traded directly in 
the capital markets, usually owing to information asymmetries that require the 
screening, monitoring, and pricing of individual risks. Financial intermediaries 
sell these individual financial products, aggregating their exposure from these 
products, and establishing positions in the secondary market to hedge their 
exposure. The role of a financial intermediary is to provide a bridge between 
the capital markets and the specific financial needs of  individuals. As such, 
intermediaries can minimize the distortions created by transactions costs and 
accomplish an efficient allocation of resources in the economy by helping indi- 
viduals diversify their financial positions. 
Insurance Companies as Intermediaries 
Property-casualty-insurance  companies are the  primary  intermediary  fi- 
nancing the insurance of natural disaster risk in the United States today. As 
mentioned above, individuals living in disaster-prone areas of the United States 
hold a long position in disaster risk. In providing disaster insurance, an insur- 
ance company offers to assume a portion (e.g., over a deductible) of the policy- 
holder’s disaster-risk exposure in exchange for a premium. After accumulating 
these policyholder positions, the insurance company can diversify its net disas- 
ter exposure through portfolio diversification and through the purchase of ei- 
ther reinsurance or capital market derivatives that directly hedge the insurer’s 
exposure. Any remaining disaster exposure is borne by  the stockholders of 
the insurance company. Therefore, insurance firms add value to the market for 
disaster risk through their role as a low-cost transactor in the capital market 
and their ability to diversify disaster risks through risk pooling (aggregation), 
risk identification and segregation, and risk monitoring (Priest 1996). 
Diversification through risk pooling is achieved by creating a large portfolio 
of independent and identically distributed risks, the result being that (by the 
law of large numbers) the variance of the average expected loss in the portfolio 
becomes smaller. That is, for independent risks, the mean risk for an insurance 
pool, and for society in general, is less than the individual risks in the pool. Of 
course, for statistically correlated risks, the benefits of risk pooling are signifi- 
cantly reduced, and insurance becomes less attractive. The opportunities for 
risk diversification through pooling are more limited in the market for cata- 
strophic risk, where risks are highly correlated. Even for a pool containing the 
entire U.S.  market, the mean risk will have substantial variance, and the annual 
flow of insurance premiums will vary greatly from actual disaster losses. 
Insurers also diversify through risk identification and segregation. Insurance 
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sessing and pricing the risk inherent in the property being insured. For many 
risks covered by  insurance contracts, information on the underlying insured 
risk is not generally available. As a result, insurance companies are needed to 
identify and segment risks into appropriate risk categories. This information- 
intensive evaluation process is accomplished through explicit insurer screening 
mechanisms, offering a menu of contracts that enable different risk groups to 
self-select the best available contract given their own private information and 
through a continuous monitoring of the underlying risk. By  segregating risks 
into risk pools, insurers improve the predictive accuracy of the aggregate risk 
insured and reduce the mean risk to society in a manner analogous to risk 
aggregation. For example, the variance in expected losses of two independent 
risk pools with different expected losses will be less than the variance in ex- 
pected losses associated with the combined pool. 
Furthermore, by charging insurance premiums commensurate with risk, in- 
surers relay valuable information to the insured concerning their relative risk 
exposure: information that will often influence the behavior of the insured. For 
example, if insurers provided premium discounts for hazard mitigation, high- 
risk properties would have an incentive to undertake cost-effective mitigation 
actions to reduce their insurance rates, thereby reducing the aggregate expo- 
sure. Similarly, higher-priced premiums increase the cost of undertaking risk- 
ier activities; and, to the extent that risk-taking activity is reduced, total risk in 
the economy is lower. 
Insurance companies also control risk through the use of deductibles, coin- 
surance, and coverage exclusions to limit moral hazard and other forms of 
distributional risk shifting by the insured. By transferring a portion of the risk 
of loss back to the insured party, deductibles and coinsurance attempt to align 
the interest of the policyholder with the interest of the insurance company- 
to mitigate the risk of  a claim. As a result, these provisions lower insurance 
costs and expand the availability of insurance to more of society. 
Limited Liability and Default Risk 
Insurance companies clearly serve a valuable role in identifying, monitor- 
ing, pricing, and controlling the individual risks associated with property cov- 
erage: risks that are too asymmetrically under the control of the insured to be 
effectively traded directly in the capital markets. However, as financial inter- 
mediaries, insurance companies suffer from a problem endemic to all interme- 
diaries: the risk of financial insolvency. When a policyholder purchases an in- 
surance policy from an insurer, he or she obtains an option to collect from the 
intermediary under certain states of  the world. The policyholder’s ability to 
collect on this contract, however, is contingent on the claims-paying ability of 
the intermediary under that state of the world. The claims-paying ability of the 
intermediary, in turn, depends on its entire structure of the insurer’s assets and 
liabilities and its ability to hedge its aggregate exposure in the broader capital 
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The problem with natural disaster risk (and any risk subject to catastrophic 
loss) is that the exposure to a catastrophic event has a substantial effect on the 
solvency of  the insuring firm. Since customers often cannot diversify away 
this institutional exposure by taking positions in the market (given transactions 
costs), the premium levels that the customer is willing to pay for this insurance 
will be a function, not only of the pure financial instrument purchased, but also 
of the intermediary’s financial condition. 
Thus, it is interesting to note that, if  there is an exogenous increase (de- 
crease) in the perceived risk exposure of  insurance companies owing to the 
arrival of new information on the nature of the risk being insured, and if this 
new information decreases (increases) the policyholders’ perception of the fi- 
nancial  solvency of  the  insurance  firm, policyholders  should decrease (in- 
crease) the amount that they are willing to pay in premiums for a given level 
of insurance. Ironically, this reduction in demand would occur exactly when 
insurance companies would be lobbying to raise rates to cover their overexpo- 
sure to the insured risk-possibly  compounding any perceived “availability” 
gap in the market for insurance coverage. 
To enhance their claims-paying ability, reduce their disaster-risk exposure, 
and maximize franchise value, insurance companies attempt to hedge the net 
exposure of their portfolio in the capital market. In this regard, insurance com- 
panies have relied almost exclusively on stockholder capital and reinsurance. 
While financial theory suggests that reinsurance is redundant in the condi- 
tions of capital market equilibrium for diversified firms, many companies and 
their stockholders do not have well-diversified portfolios and cannot diversify 
the residual  nonsystemic risk inherent in an insurance company’s portfolio 
(Doherty  and Tinic  1981). Furthermore,  factors such  as taxes,  bankruptcy 
costs, regulations, real service advantages, and overinvestment decisions make 
reinsurance  an attractive option for insurance companies (for a review, see 
Lewis and Murdock [  19961). 
Like all firms, insurance companies must hold capital as a buffer for losses. 
In 1995, the market value of capital and surplus in property-casualty lines was 
roughly $232 billion, with approximately $20 billion representing the capital 
in U.S. reinsurance firms (IS0 1994). However, this more than $200 billion in 
capital supports all property-casualty lines, with as little as one-tenth support- 
ing property losses from disaster-related claims. Furthermore, while some in- 
surance firms may hold sufficient capital to buffer disaster losses, many region- 
ally concentrated firms do not. 
While reinsurers provide a useful source of capital for regional and local 
insurance firms and play an integral role in expanding capacity in the primary- 
insurance market, the comparative advantage of reinsurers is to enhance spatial 
diversification. In terms of intertemporal diversification of  disaster risk, re- 
insurance firms must also look to the capital markets to hedge their exposure 
there. As a result, stockholders in insurance and reinsurance companies bear 
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Andrew, firms in at-risk areas of Florida experienced a significant decline in 
their stock value as a result of their hurricane exposure (Lamb 1995).’ Unfortu- 
nately, three factors inhibit the ability of disaster losses to be effectively diver- 
sified through capital market investments by stockholders in insurance compa- 
nies: (a)  Stockholders do not receive an ex ante premium on their investments 
associated with their catastrophic exposure, nor can they hedge their net expo- 
sure to disaster risk through other capital market securities. (b)  Stockholders 
have had little information on the basis of which to assess the catastrophic 
exposure of the insurance company. (c)  Stockholders have limited liability to 
cover the losses of an insurance firm: as a result, the residual losses of insolvent 
insurers can be pushed back to policyholders, solvent insurers, or state taxpay- 
ers through the state-guarantee system, creating an incentive for management 
to undertake higher-risk (“go-for-broke”) investment strategies. 
For the most part, insured losses from disasters have been covered within 
the insurance industry. In Florida, losses from Hurricane Andrew did result in 
the failure of  twelve  insurance  companies,  but  these  firms were relatively 
small, and claims owed under their policies were covered by shareholders and 
the state-guarantee system (IS0 1996). The prospect of larger disasters in the 
near future, however, has led to considerable concern over the ability of the 
insurance system to meet catastrophic disaster claims. In response, consider- 
able attention has been focused on creating alternative market mechanisms for 
insurance companies to hedge their exposure to natural disaster risk. 
The Development of a Secondary Market for Catastrophic Risk 
After Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake, insurance and rein- 
surance companies were concerned that a large catastrophic  disaster would 
quickly exhaust the existing capital base in the insurance and reinsurance in- 
dustry. As a result, insurers started looking for alternative forms of inexpensive 
capital. The natural place to look was the $19 trillion capital markets. 
The prospect of finding a cheap source of capital through disaster derivatives 
or securitization was alluring to insurance and reinsurance firms because of the 
sheer size of the market. If financed through the capital markets, natural disas- 
ter  losses  of  the magnitudes  of  the  Northridge  Earthquake  and  Hurricane 
Andrew would often be swamped in normal trading volatility in the market. 
Furthermore, insurers hoped that capital market instruments would provide a 
cheaper source of funding than reinsurance and, therefore, would be more sup- 
portable at given primary-insurance rates. 
At the same time, catastrophe securities offer advantages to institutional in- 
vestors. On the investor side, the attraction of securities in disaster risk is the 
ability to better diversify the investment portfolio by  adding a nonredundant 
5. Interestingly, property-casualty stocks appreciated following the Lorna Prieta Earthquake, 
suggesting an investor anticipation of higher demand for insurance (Shelor, Anderson, and Cross 
1992; Aiuppa, Carney, and Krueger 1993). Stock prices of real estate firms, however, fell after the 
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security with a return that is largely uncorrelated with the returns associated 
with  stock  and  bond  portfolios  (Litzenberger,  Beaglehole,  and  Reynolds 
1996). Furthermore, an examination of the reinsurance market suggests that 
the potential investor return from catastrophe securities could be significant. 
An industry analysis performed by J. P. Morgan estimated that, while investor 
returns on capital investments in reinsurance companies were volatile, the ex- 
pected return over a three-year period was in the neighborhood of  18-22  per- 
cent per year (English 1996). Thus, it is likely that catastrophe securities can 
be structured to yield an attractive risk-adjusted rate of return for investors. 
Prior to the advent of  catastrophe bonds, the only way  an investor could 
take a position in disaster risk was through ownership of  a property-casualty 
insurance or reinsurance company, as demonstrated by the growth in the Ber- 
muda reinsurance market. However, investing capital through a reinsurance or 
insurance company requires the assumption of a larger bundle of  risks. For 
example, even if a reinsurer provided only catastrophic disaster coverage, the 
investor in the reinsurance firm would bear the credit risk associated with the 
reinsurer’s investment policies. Thus, a capital market mechanism that allows a 
reinsurance company to evaluate, underwrite, and monitor the risks, but allows 
investors to invest directly in the catastrophe exposure, may be more efficient. 
The private mortgage market for nonconforming loans provides a useful ex- 
ample of the effective role that a financial intermediary can play.  Mortgage 
assets are underwritten, pooled, and serviced by a primary originator of mort- 
gages. The originator then packages the assets into a pool and sells the pool 
to a private conduit. The conduit then sells securities in the capital markets 
representing direct or indirect rights in the package of assets. In this way, the 
risks inherent in the cash flows of the assets can be diversified through the 
capital markets. As a result, these securities transactions, which also provide 
tax and regulatory relief, are a valuable source of competitively priced capital 
for mortgage banks (Han and Lai 1995). 
The mortgage market provides a direct analogue for the property-casualty 
insurance market. In the case of mortgages, an intermediary (e.g., a bank) eval- 
uates and monitors the risk of loss to the mortgage pool from a mortgage de- 
fault. In many cases, such a default is determined by a decline in the value of 
the property supporting the mortgage, giving the mortgagor the incentive to 
default on the mortgage. The cash flows associated with the mortgage pool are 
passed through to the pool and distributed to investors in mortgage-backed 
securities. In the case of property insurance, an intermediary (i.e., an insurance 
company) underwrites the risk of loss from an event (e.g., natural disaster) that 
could reduce the insured value of the property on which the policy is written. 
The cash flows associated with all property-casualty policies are then pooled 
internally within the insurance company, with residual earnings distributed to 
stockholders or, if  the policies were securitized, the investor in the disaster- 
liability securities. 
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the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1992. After recent revisions, the CBOT 
now offers catastrophe futures and call-spread options based on nine catastro- 
phe-industry-loss indices calculated by Property Claims Services. CBOT con- 
tracts are available to cover exposures on a national, regional, or high-risk-state 
basis. By basing the payout of the CBOT contracts on industry losses, the 
CBOT eliminates the ability of insurers to pass moral hazard and adverse- 
selection risk to the financial counterparty in the transaction. At the same time, 
the CBOT contracts force insurers to manage “basis” risk-the  differences in 
claim patterns between an individual insurer’s portfolio and the industry index 
(as well as any error introduced by discrepancies between the index and the 
actual loss experience). 
Starting in 1997, insurance and reinsurance companies can enter into direct 
risk swaps through the Catastrophe Risk Exchange (CATEX) to enhance their 
diversification  of  disaster  risk.  A  CATEX  swap  entails  exchanging  equal 
amounts of relative units of catastrophe exposure by peril. While not infusing 
new capital into the insurance market, CATEX leverages the existing capital 
resources of the industry by enhancing the ability of the insurance industry to 
diversify low to medium levels of catastrophic risk. However, since the CA- 
TEX market is operated outside a formal exchange with no counterparty risk 
controls, the catastrophe swap market has been slow in developing. 
Other derivative markets that have developed during the past four years in- 
clude contingent lines of credit, contingent equity financing, and credit-linked 
notes: (a)  A contingent line of credit (CLOC) is a commitment by a bank to 
provide a revolving line of credit to an insurer in the wake of  a prespecified 
range of  catastrophe losses, subject to the insurer’s continued financial sol- 
vency. While usually representing only a marginal source of additional fund- 
ing, these CLOCs help insurers mitigate a run-up in debt-funding costs created 
by  postevent financing. (b)  Pioneered by AON’s  CatEPut, contingent equity 
financing represents the sale of  an over-the-counter put option to an insurer 
that allows the insurer to “put” a portion of its catastrophic losses to the issuer 
in exchange for a transfer of equity shares. (c) Credit-linked notes or surplus 
share notes are closely akin to selling investors a credit derivative packaged in 
a standard debt-financing scheme. In exchange for bearing the credit risk of the 
insurer, the investors receive an additional interest spread (option premium). 
Examples of  credit-linked notes include the Nationwide (1994), St. Paul Re- 
insurance (1997) and Hanover (1  997) transactions. 
Finally, several attempts have been made to “securitize” the catastrophic lia- 
bility exposure of individual insurance companies or state reinsurance pools 
directly in the capital markets. For instance, Guy Carpenter, J. P. Morgan, and 
other capital market institutions have offered “act-of-God’’ bonds as a source 
of financing for insurance companies. Act-of-God bonds are debt instruments 
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insurance firm.  To compensate investors for the risks of  lost principal, these 
bonds carry high coupon rates (e.g., 10 percent over Treasury securities). 
While the success of these catastrophe bonds has been mixed over the past 
two years, the issuance of over $400 million in act-of-God bonds by USAA in 
1997 and 1998 may represent a turning point in the evolution of these securi- 
ties. Under these transactions, bondholders  stand to lose  interest payments 
(principal protected securities) or interest and principal payments (principal 
unprotected securities) if  USAA's  losses from a catastrophic humcane over 
the next twelve to eighteen months exceed $1 billion. Investors cover a share 
of losses in excess of $1 billion up to a cap of $1.5 billion, with USAA main- 
taining a 20 percent share between the trigger and the cap to mollify concerns 
over moral hazard or adverse selection. In  1997, investors earned 273-576 
basis points over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) depending on 
whether they purchased a principal protected or a principal at-risk participa- 
tion. 
Thanks to an aggressive marketing campaign, the 1997 USAA transaction 
was actually oversubscribed by investors, and USAA was able to place $100 
million in principal protected and $300 million in principal unprotected debt 
securities. Furthermore, the transaction demonstrated a willingness on the part 
of  investors to bear a portion of  the risk for events that, on an industrywide 
scale, would result in losses of $25-$35  billion. As such, the USAA transaction 
set the stage for several additional deals in late 1997 and 1998, including earth- 
quake bonds  covering California  (Swiss Re) and Japanese (Tokio-Marine) 
earthquake exposure. In total, approximately $1 billion in cat bonds was issued 
in 1997, with a similar volume of deals in  1998. 
Still, some pessimism remains concerning the capacity of the private capital 
markets to absorb a large number of  USAA-type transactions. The problem 
for institutional investors appears to be the great deal of uncertainty concerning 
the assessment of catastrophic disaster risk, the lack of standardization in mea- 
suring disaster losses and exposures, and the absence of an institutional struc- 
ture for disaster securities. For insurers, the current soft reinsurance market, 
the tax and accounting advantages of  reinsurance, and the little leverage of- 
fered by the cat bonds provides additional hurdles. As a result, the ultimate fate 
of the catastrophe-securities market remains uncertain. (For a further summary 
of catastrophe-risk capital market instruments, see Lewis and Davis [  19981.) 
2.1.5  Government Assistance 
Complicating the allocation of disaster risk in the United States is the provi- 
sion of subsidized postdisaster assistance. Through postdisaster assistance, in- 
dividuals can reduce their ex ante insurance coverage and shift losses to lower- 
risk individuals after a disaster occurs through a government reallocation of 
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Federal Postdisaster Assistance 
For uninsured disaster losses, the federal government provides a wide vari- 
ety of emergency relief and disaster reconstruction assistance.6 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides emergency 
relief for individual disaster losses in the form of individual and family grants 
of up to $12,200 for renters and homeowners not eligible for Small Business 
Administration  (SBA) loans (with a 75/25 percent cost share); $10,000 for 
minor home repairs (100 percent federal share); rental (or mortgage) assistance 
for the payment of  rental costs (local fair market rent) for a period of up to 
eighteen months for individuals and families unable to occupy their homes; 
crisis counseling; and disaster-unemployment assistance. 
At the state and local levels, FEMA provides cost-share grants, with at least 
75 percent covered by the federal government, to fund debris removal; emer- 
gency work assistance; and the reconstruction of public buildings and facilities 
damaged in a disaster. 
In the case of hurricanes, FEMA also provides direct insurance coverage for 
flood damage through the National Flood Insurance Program. 
The SBA provides subsidized disaster loans of up to $200,000 for uninsured 
losses to property and up to $4,000 for uninsured losses of personal contents. 
For businesses, the SBA provides disaster loans of up to 100 percent of unin- 
sured losses up to a maximum of $1.5 million. In determining the interest rate 
on the loan, the SBA differentiates on the basis of whether credit is available 
to the borrower from other sources, but both types of loans are heavily subsi- 
dized. (The loan rate is 3.63 percent when credit is determined not to be avail- 
able and 7.25-7.7  percent when credit is available.) After the Northridge Earth- 
quake, approximately $1.5 billion in SBA disaster loans was appropriated in 
disaster supplementals by Congress. 
The Department of Transportation (DOT) bears a large portion of the finan- 
cial responsibility for repairing damage to infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, 
etc.) through its emergency relief fund for disasters. For example, the DOT 
spent roughly $1.3 billion repairing infrastructure damage following the Loma 
Prieta Earthquake. 
Funds appropriated under these programs come directly from federal taxes 
and, therefore, represent a form of social insurance that cross-subsidizes areas 
exposed to disaster risk. While Kunreuther (1996) finds little explicit evidence 
supporting the argument that individuals do not purchase insurance because of 
the existence of subsidized postdisaster assistance, federal assistance may still 
implicitly affect homeowners’ incentives to purchase insurance. Consider the 
counterfactual. If no disaster aid had been provided after the Northridge Earth- 
quake, large numbers of individuals would have suffered greater losses associ- 
ated with their earthquake exposure. These losses would have generated infor- 
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mation (news stories) that would have informed a much wider population of 
the costs of not purchasing disaster insurance. It is reasonable to expect that, 
if this occurred, many more individuals would have the incentive to purchase 
disaster insurance today. 
State Disaster Programs 
Disaster losses are also financed through taxes levied on individuals within 
the state in which the disaster occurred. Given geographic constraints associ- 
ated with state borders, state taxpayer assistance usually spreads the burden 
of disaster recovery intertemporally through deficit financing-imposing  an 
intergenerational tax on future generations of state taxpayers. In addition, pre- 
mium assessments levied by the state-guarantee system on surviving firms to 
cover the claims of an insolvent insurer can be deducted as a business expense 
and reduce premium taxes otherwise due. Thus, state taxpayers ultimately bear 
a portion of the cost of a disaster. 
In  recent years, however, high-risk  states have taken  a more active role 
in  designing state programs for financing disaster risk. Just within the past 
two years, Florida,  Hawaii, and California  have established  hurricane-  and 
earthquake-financing facilities  funded through  a combination  of  insurance, 
reinsurance, and state taxes. 
The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund is a mandatory, state-sponsored 
catastrophe-reinsurance pool for property insurers writing business in Florida. 
Property insurers are required to maintain a retention against qualifying catas- 
trophes (a hurricane as classified by the National Hurricane Center), but they 
may select to participate at one of three coverage levels: 45,75, or 90 percent. 
The fund is financed through insurer premiums of approximately $500 million 
per year (IS0 1996). However, the fund also has emergency borrowing author- 
ity and the ability to assess insurers in the wake of a disaster. The catastrophe 
fund currently does not have the capacity to handle losses from large hurri- 
canes like Hurricane Andrew. As a result, there is a concern among participat- 
ing firms that the residual liability of  the fund represents a growing liability 
against future earnings (Marlett and Eastman 1998). 
The California Earthquake Authority (CEA) is a state-sponsored insurance 
facility designed to provide up to $10 billion in earthquake insurance in Cali- 
fornia. The fund is financed using a combination of up-front and contingent 
insurer contributions, traditional reinsurance, and revenue bonds (CEA 1996). 
The insurance policies provided under the CEA include a 20 percent deduct- 
ible, cover only primary residential buildings, and provide limited coverage for 
building contents. As a result of the more limited earthquake-insurance policy, 
the CEA is expected to cover property losses from earthquakes at least as large 
as Northridge. 
The Hawaii Humcane Relief  Fund provides  limited  hurricane-insurance 
coverage for the state. The fund is limited to just under $2 billion in coverage, 
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Of course, the advantage of these state-run facilities is that they  are sup- 
ported by institutions with taxing authority (the state). Therefore, unlike insur- 
ance companies, the risk of insolvency is much lower for state pools. In fact, 
if states could enforce a closed exchange of risk within their boundaries, state 
pools  could  theoretically  be  structured  to  replicate  efficient  risk-sharing 
pools-with  disaster claims reallocated after a disaster in accordance with the 
ex ante provision  of  state-insurance contracts to all homeowners. This  ap- 
proach would clearly force homeowners within the state to internalize the risk 
of their disaster exposure and could lead to an optimal sharing of disaster risk 
within the state. 
Unfortunately, the provision of federal assistance, the incentives to redistrib- 
ute disaster losses to future generations, and the spreading of claims payments 
to other states through the state-guarantee system introduce leakages into the 
state pooling system that limit the ability of the states to create effective risk 
pools. Furthermore, state programs offer little benefits for larger-scale disas- 
ters where the in-state correlation in claims is high. The disaster risks of the 
individual states in the United States can be better diversified through the cre- 
ation of larger risk pools on a national or an international level. Finally, politics 
at the state level could result in an underpricing of the true risk assumed by the 
state facility. 
A recognition of this limitation has resulted in proposals for the creation of 
multistate pools. However, multistate pools must confront a serious problem 
of moral hazard. If a multistate pool is inadequately structured, any one state 
in  the pool  would  have  an incentive  to  suppress insurance rates  within  its 
boundaries for political gain while shifting additional liability to other states 
through the pool. As such, there is little incentive for lower-risk states to partic- 
ipate in such pools. Finally, research suggests that government-run  insurance 
mechanisms have no comparative advantage over insurance and reinsurance 
firms in assessing, pricing, or controlling the risks in an insurance or reinsur- 
ance portfolio (Priest 1996). 
2.2  Weaknesses in the Current System 
The discussion in the previous section identified two major sources of inef- 
ficiency in the current allocation of disaster risk in the United States: (1) the 
failure of individuals to internalize the risk exposure of their properties, which 
results in a socially suboptimal level of disaster mitigation, and (2) the absence 
of  any private funding mechanism for spreading disaster claims intertempo- 
rally. In this section, we discuss these two weaknesses in more detail. 
2.2.  I  Inappropriate Incentives for Mitigation in 
New Construction Decisions 
As discussed in section 2.1.3, individuals  do not appear to internalize the 
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whether to purchase insurance, or how much they should mitigate against fu- 
ture losses. At this point, it is not clear whether this failure to internalize disas- 
ter risk is caused by individuals’ lack of adequate information about their disas- 
ter exposure  or a divergence between individual  and societal  objectives in 
reducing disaster risk. In either case, the current system for managing natural 
disaster risks does not provide appropriate incentives for mitigation, especially 
with respect to decisions about new construction. 
This absence of mitigation incentives has repercussions across a number of 
dimensions. First, buildings continue to be constructed in high-risk areas, actu- 
ally increasing society’s overall exposure to disaster risk. One example of such 
a situation would be when a new home is constructed on a soft foundation over 
a fault rather than in a safer location on more solid ground. Second, designs, 
building materials, and the nature of  construction are held to a less rigorous 
standard than is efficient for society as a whole. This is particularly problem- 
atic because, once a building is constructed, it is far more costly to retrofit the 
building than it is to incorporate mitigation investments during construction. 
For example, once a building is completed, retrofitting against earthquake risk 
often requires tearing out interior walls to add new structural framing7 As 
such, owners may view the risk of loss from natural disaster as a “sunk cost.” 
From the vantage point of  society, a more efficient management  of  natural 
disaster risks would internalize the full cost of  natural disaster risks in the 
construction process. 
By examining the private market process by which new construction is built, 
we can gain a clearer understanding of why the present system fails to internal- 
ize these risks fully. For simplicity, we will consider the case of a new residen- 
tial home-although  a parallel analysis could be described for other types of 
construction as well. The incentive for the home builder is to maximize profits. 
This requires buying land, building a home that maximizes the difference be- 
tween the perceived value by the customer and the cost of construction, and 
then selling the home to its first purchaser. If the first homeowner derives no 
perceived value from mitigation investments and these investments have a cost, 
the builder has little incentive to undertake mitigation investments. The build- 
er’s incentives to internalize natural disaster risk in the value of the home criti- 
cally depend on the first customer’s perceived value of these investments. 
For the purchaser, most mitigation investments are hidden from view-built 
into the structural design and dependent on the quality of  the workmanship 
(nail density, types of fasteners used, quality of framing materials, etc.). The 
design  is  somewhat observable-if  the purchaser  were  to  study  the blue- 
prints-but  few homeowners have the ability or interest to study blueprints. 
Second, even if consumers could observe all mitigation investments, it is not 
7. Of course, some mitigation actions can be completed with far less reconstruction (e.g.. strap- 
ping down water heaters, bolting the walls to the foundation, and improving the structural integrity 
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clear that they would value them at a socially efficient level. Large natural 
disasters occur infrequently, and it is well documented in the field of psychol- 
ogy  that  consumers have  nonconvex preferences  around  small-probability, 
large-magnitude events (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic  1988). Intuitively, be- 
cause a 500-year-cycle earthquake is not expected to happen for another 250 
years, a homeowner’s children, grandchildren,  and great-grandchildren  will 
probably not even be alive when the earthquake hits. It may  be difficult to 
internalize this kind of risk in decision making, especially since homeowners 
are often looking to move after a period of six to seven years. 
Finally, we can look at the role of  financing in property purchases. Under 
current underwriting rules for most mortgages, prospective home buyers are 
limited in the amount of housing that they can purchase by  constraints that 
limit total monthly payments for the loan, taxes, insurance, etc. to a fraction of 
the purchaser’s income. Included in these underwriting guidelines is a require- 
ment that buyers have homeowner’s insurance to protect the collateral support- 
ing the mortgage. However, few lenders require the purchase of natural disaster 
insurance. Therefore, homeowners have little incentive to purchase additional 
disaster insurance because (a)  it is not required by the lender and (6) the addi- 
tional insurance payments would further limit the amount of housing that the 
home buyer could afford. 
Thus, if we examine the new construction process as a whole, we see the 
following dynamic. Builders maximize their customers’ (the first purchasers) 
perceived value of the property. Owing both to their inability accurately to 
monitor the value of mitigation investments and to the paucity of information 
on individual disaster exposures, these customers do not fully value disaster- 
mitigation investments. As a result, there are (from a societal viewpoint) too 
few incentives to incorporate mitigation in new construction decisions. Fur- 
thermore, because most lenders do not require the purchase of disaster insur- 
ance, a natural mechanism to create incentives for mitigation (one based on 
the monthly cost of disaster insurance) is not a part of the current private mech- 
anism for managing natural disaster risk. 
2.2.2  Lack of Reinsurance Coverage for Large (over $30 Billion) Risks 
Although the magnitude of losses from natural disasters over the last decade 
has been significantly greater than it has been over any previous decade in the 
postwar period, there exists a significant risk that a disaster causing far greater 
damage may occur. As an example, if Humcane Andrew had struck Miami, 
insured losses alone may  have exceeded $40 billion (Van Anne and Larsen 
1993). A loss of  this magnitude would present a considerable strain on the 
solvency of the U.S. insurance industry. 
Unfortunately, as discussed in section 2.1 above, neither the insurance nor 
the securities model is sufficient to diversify the risk of loss arising from a 
large-scale natural disaster. In the case of a natural disaster, losses occur mainly 
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generally publicly available and is asymmetrically distributed in favor of the 
insured (i.e., property maintenance, the quality of building construction, and 
the enforcement of  building codes). As a result, protection  against loss for 
property has traditionally been provided through insurance products. 
The losses associated with a natural disaster, however, are not statistically 
independent within the affected region but geographically correlated within 
that risk pool. As a result, the larger the population area affected by the disaster, 
the less effective insurance is as a diversification tool. Furthermore, the losses 
arising from large natural disasters are idiosyncratic through time in the aggre- 
gate and hence not diversifiable through the creation of a large portfolio of like 
risks. This creates stress on an insurance-based risk-management mechanism 
because, as the size of the event increases beyond some level, the underlying 
loss characteristics of disaster risk diverge from the characteristics best served 
by the insurance model. On the other hand, the magnitude of loss that arises 
from a given event depends in large part on the quality of construction of indi- 
vidual property units-information  that is not publicly available and that is 
asymmetrically distributed in favor of the insured. Thus, disaster risk cannot 
be solely diversified through the trading of securities. 
Lewis and Murdock (1996) contend that the shortcoming of this system is 
that, given the infrequency and magnitude of  losses from natural disasters, 
catastrophe risks need to be diversified intertemporally as well as spatially. For 
small and medium-sized disasters, the geographic diversification accomplished 
through traditional insurance and reinsurance markets is clearly adequate for 
financing disaster losses. However, the existence of limited liability and bank- 
ruptcy costs prevents insurance and reinsurance firms from fully diversifying 
disaster risk intertemporally. While growing, private securities markets (where 
private agents also have limited liability) currently lack the information, stan- 
dardization, and institutional structure to support a high volume of catastrophe 
risk financing. Consequently, these markets have yet to fill the gap in the mar- 
ket for financing upper-middle layers of disaster risk.8 
This lack of reinsurance capacity has significant repercussions in terms of 
the availability of  primary  insurance  for homeowners,  particularly  in  such 
disaster-prone states as California and Florida. When primary insurers cannot 
purchase reinsurance, they must pay claims after a large disaster out of their 
accumulated reserves. When their total (unhedged) exposure equals a signifi- 
cant fraction of their individual reserves, it is only prudent to stop writing poli- 
cies. This results in a lack of availability of primary insurance. Therefore, any 
effort to expand insurance coverage for disaster risks must include a solution 
for improving the private sector’s ability to spread disaster claims over time. 
8. Clearly, the  discussion in this paper  is limited to disaster risks that  can be estimated and 
priced with a certain degree of precision. Excluded from consideration are disaster risks for which 
the probability of occurrence is so uncertain that the estimation error swamps the estimates of loss, 
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2.3  Framework of Government Policy 
From the vantage point of society, it is important to understand the repercus- 
sions of the weaknesses identified in the previous section. If homeowners’ de- 
cisions on where to locate, how much insurance to purchase, and what level of 
mitigation to undertake fail to reflect the natural disaster risk inherent in their 
properties, the aggregate exposure of the U.S. economy to disaster losses will 
increase. If the losses associated with these decisions implicitly to absorb more 
risk were completely borne by the individuals making these decisions, then the 
interests of the individuals and the interests of society would be aligned. How- 
ever, the current system for financing disaster risk incorporates a significant 
degree of cross-subsidization. Thus, individual decisions to absorb disaster risk 
result in a shifting of risk to other members of  society, creating a suboptimal 
level of hazard protection. 
For society, disaster policy  should look to increase the  internalization of 
disaster risk in individual decisions, reducing the ability of individuals to in- 
crease (and shift) society’s exposure to disaster events. At the same time, en- 
hancing society’s ability to finance disaster risk across time will allow for a 
greater degree of risk internalization in the economy. Thus, natural disaster 
policy  should examine ways to encourage better coordination in the private 
sector’s attempts to develop a new financing mechanism for diversifying large 
disaster claims over time. This section examines the role of federal policy in 
addressing these concerns. 
As discussed above, a large portion of natural disaster risk management is 
performed by property-casualty insurance companies that are regulated at the 
state level. The system of  state insurance regulation has evolved at the state 
and local level over the past two hundred years. However, the strict delegation 
of  insurance regulation  to the states (except in instances where federal law 
specifically supersedes state law) was formally codified in 1945 with the pas- 
sage of  the McCarren-Ferguson  Act.  However,  the  state insurance  system, 
which focuses on the premiums, market practices, and solvency of insurance 
companies, remains in flux (Klein 1995). 
Like that of  regulation in other areas of the economy, the theory of regula- 
tion in the insurance industry generally falls into one of two camps: laissez- 
faire or government intervention. That is, the first group believes that the mar- 
ket  equilibrium, even if  second best,  represents the most  efficient outcome 
available. When asked to explain the existence of regulation in the insurance 
industry, members of this school often adopt a public choice interpretation  of 
regulation: regulation reflects the special interests of the regulated entities set- 
ting rules to bolster their market power (Buchanan and Tullock  1966; Stigler 
1971). 
In contrast, supporters of government intervention in the market generally 
support a public interest theory  of regulation  (see Musgrave and Musgrave 
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imperfect competition, externalities, public goods, economies of scale, etc.) 
can lead to a suboptimal allocation of scarce resources in the economy and 
that government intervention designed to correct these market failures can be 
used to improve this market equilibrium. In this framework, government inter- 
vention is often seen as a substitute for coordination in the private markets. 
In this paper, we introduce a different framework, one in which the goal of 
government policy is not to substitute for, or to replace, coordination in the 
private marketplace but rather to facilitate more efficient coordination in the 
private sector. This is the market-enhancing view of government policy (Aoki, 
Murdock, and Okuno-Fujiaara  1996). Underlying this framework is the pre- 
sumption that decentralized decision making is, in general, more efficient than 
centralized control. Thus, private-sector coordination is preferable to signifi- 
cant government intervention. Therefore, the goal of this approach is to pro- 
mote the creation of private-sector institutions that increase the efficiency of 
private-sector coordination. 
2.3.1 
First, let us examine the more traditional policy prescriptions,  beginning 
with the laissez-faire policy. Here, the presumption is that, in the absence of 
distortion-inducing government interventions, the outcome from decentralized 
private-sector activity would be efficient (or at least more efficient than the 
alternative with government intervention). In many instances, this view has 
merit. For example, if state insurance commissioners suppress insurance rates 
to a “politically acceptable” level where insurers can no longer cover the vari- 
able cost of providing insurance or recoup their initial investments in providing 
service to that state, the market will withdraw capacity, creating an availability 
crisis (Harrington 1992).  Attempts by insurance commissioners to impose exit 
restrictions to prevent this exodus from the market will only compound the 
misallocation of resources in the insurance market and provide strong disin- 
centives for future entry into that state. In contrast, if price ceilings are not 
imposed, insurance premiums will rise to the point where natural disaster in- 
surance will be available to all willing to pay the market-clearing price.9 
Unfortunately, laissez-faire policy does not adequately address the weak- 
nesses in the current system for internalizing natural disaster risk in new con- 
struction decisions or provide suggestions for filling the current gap in the lack 
of capacity to diversify claims over time. For example, with respect to upper 
tiers of disaster financing, the laissez-faire approach has a presumption that, in 
the absence of any price controls, primary and reinsurance capacity would ap- 
pear and the market would clear. There is some evidence supporting this con- 
clusion. Two years after the Northridge Earthquake, and four years after Hurri- 
“Traditional” Views of Government Action 
9. If the government were concerned about the real “affordability” of insurance, it could allow 
premiums to rise to market-clearing levels and then subsidize the purchase of  insurance for those 
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cane Andrew, new capital started flowing into the reinsurance industry. By the 
end of  1997, industry experts estimated that over $5 billion in new risk capital 
had been accumulated in the Bermuda market alone, resulting in considerable 
downward pressure on reinsurance rates. When faced with large catastrophic 
claims, however, this new capacity may prove to be an unstable source of risk 
capital, especially given the rapidity with which reinsurance capital has exited 
the insurance market in the past (Berger, Cummins, and Tennyson 1992). Soft 
reinsurance markets are already causing many of these new reinsurers to look 
for alternative ways of leveraging their risk capital. 
The other traditional policy alternative is to look to government intervention 
to “solve” these “market failures.” With respect to the internalization of risk, 
the government could simply increase the requirements of building codes to a 
sufficiently high level so that disaster-risk protection is always incorporated 
into new construction. Again, there is some merit to this view. By providing 
some minimum base level of expectations, all participants in the construction 
process-architects,  builders, inspectors, etc.-raise  their standards for how 
buildings are constructed. 
Unfortunately, this ‘‘command and control” policy has a number of  flaws. 
Any building  code is a rule book, and, even though these rules have some 
flexibility, a rule book has the effect of imposing a “one-size-fits-all” solution 
to any building problem. In reality, a huge variety of circumstances face any 
particular builder in any given location. In the case of earthquakes, the local 
geography, proximity to fault lines, the likely character of a given earthquake 
(whether the shaking is vertical or horizontal), etc. all differ widely for each 
project. It is simply not feasible for building codes to specify all possible con- 
tingencies. 
More important, for codes to be effective, they must be enforced, and there 
are insufficient incentives, at present, to ensure proper enforcement of building 
codes. From a builder’s perspective, building codes only impose costs. From 
the local government’s perspective, building inspectors and more effective in- 
spections cost money. Furthermore, cities have an incentive to remain lax on 
building-code enforcement when competing with neighboring cities for new 
developments, as seen in the experience of Florida after Humcane Andrew. 
Even though very rigorous building codes were on the books, builders simply 
ignored the codes. As a consequence, homes suffered significant damage in the 
storm because their roofs were improperly attached to the rest of the structure. 
In the case of reinsurance capacity, the government-intervention approach 
would simply call for the federal government to step in and provide disaster 
insurance. This approach has  significant risks,  as government agencies  are 
notoriously unreliable  at providing efficient, unsubsidized  insurance  (Priest 
1996). Furthermore, there are significant political pressures to hold premiums 
at artificially low levels, and government bureaucrats may have less incentive 
to manage the risk exposure of the government than do the agents of private 
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succeed at providing disaster-insurance capacity, but at the cost of significant 
losses on claims paid out in the future and a worsening of  the incentives to 
build new construction more efficiently (since arguably the government would 
be less apt to set risk-based insurance premiums properly). 
Thus, neither traditional approach offers an attractive option for improving 
the market’s allocation of disaster risk once the costs of intervention or inaction 
are assessed. Therefore, we turn to a discussion of a new framework for federal 
policy, a framework that we believe is appropriate for an industry regulated at 
the state level. 
2.3.2  The Market-Enhancing View 
The market-enhancing view of government policy is a fundamentally differ- 
ent approach  than either the laissez-faire or the public  interest theory. The 
market-enhancing approach looks for the role of government to facilitate more 
efficient private-sector coordination, complementing the market while respect- 
ing the  advantages  of  decentralized  information  processing.  In  contrast  to 
traditional  government intervention, which centralizes  decision making, the 
market-enhancing  view  promotes  the  decentralization  of  decision-making 
power in the market. At the same time, this view recognizes that there are 
potential inefficiencies associated with decentralized coordination that are left 
unaddressed under a laissez-faire approach to government policy. These inef- 
ficiencies arise when the decentralized agents have inefficient incentives that 
are not aligned with maximizing  social welfare (e.g., individuals’ failure to 
internalize disaster risk) or when there exists a need for significant coordina- 
tion of a large number of these decentralized agents to promote a shift to a 
more efficient equilibrium (e.g., the need to develop new financial markets for 
catastrophic risk). 
An important dimension of the market-enhancing view that distinguishes it 
from the public interest theory of regulation is the emphasis on the importance 
of  local information. Whereas most government interventions require  some 
kind of central agent to process information and make decisions that affect a 
large number of outcomes, an intervention designed to be market enhancing sim- 
ply attempts to align the incentives of decentralized private agents with socially 
efficient incentives. Then the decentralized private agents can use the locally 
available information to come up with market-based solutions that are signifi- 
cantly more efficient than those that could be imposed by a central authority. 
2.4  Applications of the Framework 
In this section, we apply the framework of the market-enhancing  view to 
analyze two of the many public policy proposals that have been suggested in 
the debate over managing catastrophic disaster risk. The first policy is to re- 
quire the purchase of disaster insurance on all new construction (i.e., all new 
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create a mechanism whereby  private-sector  agents (in this  case, new  home 
builders) internalize the risk of natural disasters into the construction decision. 
The second policy is to have the federal government develop a financing mech- 
anism that enhances the intertemporal diversification of natural disaster risks 
and then have the government gradually cede the market to the private sector. 
2.4.1 
In section 2.2 above, we identified the root cause of why there was insuffi- 
cient incentive for builders to construct “disaster-safe’’ houses-because  pur- 
chasers do not fully perceive the value of mitigation investments. Recognizing 
this issue as the central question, we ask whether there is any mechanism to 
overcome this market failure. In this section, we analyze one possible solu- 
tion-instituting  a  requirement  that  all  homeowners  obtaining  a  mortgage 
from a  federally  related  institution  for new  construction  must  obtain  all- 
hazards insurance in addition to traditional homeowner’s insurance. 
If enacted as a government policy, this approach would result in a gradual 
“phase-in’’ of disaster insurance so that, ultimately, disaster-insurance capacity 
will be available to all homeowners. Once new home buyers are required to 
buy disaster insurance on new construction, the price of insurance will affect 
homeowners’ decisions on where to locate and their desired level of investment 
in mitigation against future disaster losses. As a result, builders will have in- 
centives to manage the cost of disaster insurance for their home buyers. If they 
can design a home that has a lower cost of disaster insurance, they will be able 
to capture a higher price for their homes. Thus, to the extent that there are 
differential rates on disaster insurance, builders will have incentives to design 
in mitigation measures that are cost effective.’O 
Equally important, builders and insurance companies will have incentives to 
work together to develop varying grades of certification for the new disaster- 
proof construction. This will allow the insurance companies to price the risk 
of natural disaster loss more accurately and will increase the builders’ ability 
to reduce the cost of  disaster insurance for homeowners (and thus allow the 
builders to capture higher profits). Thus, in their search for higher profits, these 
two industries will choose to work together to come up with mechanisms to 
reduce the risk of loss from natural disasters. 
Once this policy of  a disaster-insurance requirement for new construction 
has been put in place (and after an initial period of adjustment), new construc- 
tion will be designed and built with a much higher level of investment in disas- 
ter mitigation. Moreover, these investments will be determined in a decentral- 
ized manner, by builders responding to a price mechanism, which in this case 
is the differential price of disaster insurance between varying grades of mitiga- 
tion investment. 
An Insurance Requirement on New Construction 
10. Of  course, state regulations governing insurance pricing may  interfere in the pricing of 
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While this policy suggestion may  seem overly intrusive, there are several 
arguments in its favor: (a)  Mortgage lenders require the purchase of fire insur- 
ance to secure the value of the collateral underlying a mortgage loan. This pol- 
icy  simply extends  that principle  to include natural  disaster risks.  (b)  Be- 
cause the risk of disasters will be internalized in the cost of new buildings via 
the insurance premium, new structures will be built only in areas for which the 
home buyer is willing to pay for the risk associated with the property's location, 
reducing current incentives to build in high-risk areas to a more efficient level. 
(c) Individuals will have a greater incentive to undertake  mitigation invest- 
ments in order to lower their insurance premiums, again lowering the aggre- 
gate exposure of society (Kunreuther 1996).  (d)  A larger portion of the respon- 
sibility  for  funding  the  payment  of  disaster  claims  will  be  allocated  to 
individuals with control over the disaster exposure being created-reducing 
the level of cross-subsidies in the market. (e)  By linking the proposal to new 
construction, primary-insurance  capacity will have to expand only at a rate 
equal to new construction in the United States to meet the increase in insurance 
demand generated by this proposal. Of course, the willingness of  insurers to 
expand their supply of all-hazards insurance will be a function of state insur- 
ance regulation and insurers' current exposure. (f)  By linking the provision of 
insurance to mortgages, this requirement will also provide additional protec- 
tion to mortgage pools exposed to disaster-related mortgage defaults." 
As a result, this proposal would reduce the aggregate exposure of society to 
disaster losses and improve efficiency with respect to the way in which disaster 
claims are financed. Of course, the proposal  does require an expansion of 
primary-insurance coverage for natural hazards. As such, this proposal would 
be most effective if  linked to an expansion  in  financing capacity for upper 
layers of disaster risk-an  issue to which we now turn. 
2.4.2  An Industry-Level Excess-of-Loss Contract 
The second market problem identified in section 2.2 above is the absence of 
any market mechanism for spreading large, idiosyncratic, and spatially corre- 
lated disaster claims intertemporally. As noted above, traditional property in- 
surance diversifies claims through a pooling of  risk, where the risk pool is 
held by a low-cost intermediary that specializes in assessing, monitoring, and 
pricing insurance risks. Once risks in an insurance pool become correlated, 
however, the value of insurance as a risk-diversification and financing mecha- 
nism is diminished. 
For relatively high-probability, low-severity events, property insurance is a 
classic  insurance  risk. However, when  natural  disasters create widespread 
11. A study by Duff and Phelps found that mortgage-backed security pools exposed to earth- 
quake losses in California had special hazard-loss provisions equal to approximately 1 percent of 
the pool, four times the expected losses from the highest loan-to-value categories in those pools 
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property damage within a region, claims on the pool are highly correlated, and 
the insurance mechanism breaks down. In this case, the risk of insolvency for 
the insurance company rises, the premium that homeowners are willing to pay 
for given a coverage level falls (premiums are discounted to reflect the sol- 
vency risk of the insurer), and the premiums that the insurance companies need 
to earn to capitalize against large losses increase. As a result, the insurance 
sector is thrown into disequilibrium. 
An obvious avenue by means of which insurance intermediaries can reduce 
their exposure to natural disaster risk is the $19 trillion capital market. Theoret- 
ically, as a low-cost  transactor in the market, insurance companies  are in a 
good position to diversify any residual exposures from their insurance portfolio 
by taking positions in capital market securities. Unfortunately, the develop- 
ment of capital market securities remains in its infancy, leaving a financing gap 
for insurance companies. As a result, members of the insurance industry have 
raised  the possibility  of federal intervention  in the provision  of  disaster in- 
surance. 
Lewis and Murdock (1996) argue that the federal government is in a unique 
position to utilize its ability to diversify claims intertemporally by designing a 
new risk-management mechanism for diversifying disaster risks intertempo- 
rally. However, taking a market-enhancing  view  of  government  policy, they 
argue against proposals for federalizing the provision of disaster insurance or 
reinsurance. Consistent with Priest (1996), they find that the federal govern- 
ment would have a comparative disadvantage in assessing disaster-risk expo- 
sures for individual properties or companies. 
Instead, they offer a market-based proposal where the federal government 
would attempt to expand private-insurance capacity through the creation of a 
federal excess-of-loss reinsurance mechanism narrowly targeted to the missing 
market for the intertemporal diversification  of large disaster losses.  Specifi- 
cally, the federal government would sell tradable per occurrence excess-of-loss 
(XOL) reinsurance contracts for insured disaster losses in the United States in 
the range of $25-$50  billion.  These contracts, which are equivalent  to call- 
spread options written on an industry index of disaster losses, would be auc- 
tioned  to qualified  insurance companies and would carry a maturity  of  one 
year. 
The XOL. program would be based on industry losses to minimize the moral 
hazard  associated with providing  company-specific reinsurance. Further, the 
program would be actuarially  sound and would be designed to complement 
existing  private-sector  insurance  and  reinsurance  mechanisms  by  covering 
only layers of reinsurance currently  unavailable in the private market and by 
incorporating a cost-of-capital adjustment to offset the federal government’s 
lower borrowing costs. As such, the program is designed to allow the “crowd- 
ing out” of the federal government by private-sector institutions instead of the 
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dock (1996) argue further that, by offering an efficient, nonredundant security, 
the XOL proposal actually enhances the ability of the private market to develop 
new financial instruments for financing lower levels of disaster risk in the pri- 
vate market. (For more information on the pricing of XOL contracts, see Cum- 
mins, Lewis, and Phillips [1997, chap. 3 in this volume].) 
An important aspect of the excess-of-loss program not discussed in Lewis 
and Murdock (1996) is the institutional benefits that the program would bring 
to the private market. The natural question emerging from the debate over capi- 
tal market disaster instruments is why the market has failed to fill this need for 
intertemporal risk diversification. We believe that a large portion of the answer 
to this question revolves around (a)  the great deal of  uncertainty that capital 
market institutions and institutional investors have concerning the evaluation 
of disaster risks, (b)  the lack of  standardization in measuring disaster risk or 
structuring catastrophe securities, (c) the lack of an institutional structure for 
a capital market in catastrophe risk, and (d)  the high degree of risk aversion 
exhibited by investors when faced with a financial payoff that provides a high 
risk-adjusted return but carries a small probability of a large loss. 
The model for the industry structure that would evolve with the XOL pro- 
gram is fundamentally different from the current industry model. At present, 
reinsurance  companies provide reinsurance  to a pool of  primary  insurance 
firms-diversifying  the risk geographically. Since the occurrence of large di- 
sasters is highly idiosyncratic (and has a high variance), however, reinsurance 
companies cannot adequately diversify catastrophic disaster risk through insur- 
ance pooling and remain exposed to large losses. As a result, reinsurance com- 
panies limit their exposure to catastrophic risk by limiting supply, raising the 
price of catastrophe covers, or requiring a cross-selling of other products. 
With the XOL mechanism, reinsurers would still assemble national pools of 
risk by providing an appropriate mix of reinsurance to primary insurers. How- 
ever, the XOL program would provide reinsurers with a mechanism for trans- 
ferring the responsibility of intertemporally smoothing large disaster claims to 
the federal government and, ultimately, to competing private market providers 
of similar instruments. As such, reinsurers could loosen supply constraints on 
the amount (or price) of catastrophe reinsurance being offered in the market. 
Then, as the reinsurers accumulated larger, national insurance pools, the corre- 
lation between their disaster exposure and the industry’s exposure would rise, 
increasing the value of XOL-type contracts and encouraging the establishment 
of private-label XOL structures. 
As noted above, however, the proper functioning of an XOL market requires 
a number of investments in institutional infrastructure before the market can 
flourish. First, someone must make the investment go  create an audited value 
(on agreed-on terms and parameter assumptions) for total industry losses aris- 
ing from a natural disaster and the probability of  disaster events. Second, some 
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reinsurance and insurance industry to cede a significant portion of the upper- 
end catastrophe risk. Third, the reinsurance industry and the national primary 
insurers must make substantial adjustments to their internal policies and proce- 
dures and risk-management tools to support the purchase of  XOL-type con- 
tracts. 
For the industry, these last two issues present the classic “chicken-or-egg” 
problem. The reinsurance industry is not going to make large investments to 
integrate XOL contracts into their business system unless there is a credible 
multiyear commitment to supplying these XOL contracts. However, without 
the reinsurers making this investment, there will be insufficient demand to jus- 
tify the investments required by potential suppliers of these contracts. 
The  temporary  provision  of  these  contracts  by  the  federal  government 
“solves” this coordination problem. First, the XOL contract will establish the 
standards on which all future XOL contracts (public or private) can be based. 
Second,  the  federal  government  commits  to providing  a  sufficiently  large 
supply of XOL contracts to allow reinsurers to justify the investment in chang- 
ing their business systems. As the demand for these contracts is realized, how- 
ever, the government continues to short the market for these contracts, allowing 
the private  sector to serve a growing fraction of  the market. Ultimately, the 
private sector will crowd out the federal government, and the XOL program 
will be ceded to the private sector. 
Reinsurance companies and capital market firms could take a much more 
active role in providing this coverage today. However, private capital may be 
reluctant to flow into a market before the appropriate investments are made to 
establish institutions and standards for providing information on how to struc- 
ture securities on the basis of this new asset class. The advantage of the XOL 
program is that it helps establish these institutions. The program can also serve 
as a conduit  for information on assessing natural disaster risks in  general. 
Then, once the market structure and standardization is accomplished, the pri- 
vate sector can simply “crowd out” the federal presence in the market. 
Finally, the excess-of-loss program provides an immediate expansion in the 
capacity of the reinsurance and insurance markets, greatly reducing the expo- 
sure overhang  felt by  insurers in the wake of  reassessing their disaster-risk 
exposures. As such, the program would relax the solvency concerns of policy- 
holders and investors, which will aid the market in reaching a new equilibrium. 
Without such an expansion in capacity, it is possible that concerns over coun- 
terparty solvency will prevent the development of any private market institu- 
tions in this area. 
2.5  Conclusion 
In  reviewing  the  existing  state  of  catastrophic  risk  management  in  the 
United States, this paper examined whether market-enhancing public policy 
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the basis of weaknesses identified within the current system, the paper suggests 
that at least two public policy options being discussed publicly have the poten- 
tial to generate improvements in the way in which the United States manages 
disaster risk: (a)  requiring homeowners to purchase all-hazards disaster insur- 
ance as a condition of  receiving a federally related  mortgage and (b)  estab- 
lishing a federal reinsurance mechanism, as proposed by Lewis and Murdock 
( 1996),  that allows insurers and reinsurers to purchase protection against large 
industry losses from catastrophic disasters. 
The objective of the all-hazards-insurance-purchase requirement is to estab- 
lish a direct link between individuals’ decisions to create disaster exposure and 
the recognition of the costs associated with that exposure-that  is, to increase 
the internalization  of  disaster risk. The objective  of  the federal reinsurance 
facility is to provide an immediate expansion in the capacity of the insurance 
industry to finance existing disaster exposure while providing the institutional 
investments  that  will  foster  the  development  of  more  active  private-sector 
mechanisms for financing these disaster risks. 
However, it is important to recognize that any real solution to the natural 
disaster insurance problem in the United States requires a comprehensive set 
of  policy reforms that address all aspects of disaster policy, including hazard 
mitigation,  tax policy, and the removal of any inefficiencies  or inappropriate 
incentives in the state or federal regulatory structure. In this context, the public 
policy framework developed in this paper will be a useful tool for analyzing 
the merits of alternative disaster-reform proposals. 
References 
Aiuppa, Thomas A.,  Robert J. Carney, and Thomas M. Krueger. 1993. An examination 
of  insurance stock prices following the  1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake. Journal of 
Insurance Issues and Practices 16:  1-14. 
Aoki, Masahiko, Kevin Murdock, and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiaara.  1996. Beyond the 
East-Asian miracle: Introducing the market-enhancing view. In The role of govern- 
ment in East Asian economic development:  Comparative institutional analysis, ed. 
Masahito Aoki, Hyung-Ki Kim, and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Arnott, Richard, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1990. The welfare economics of moral hazard. In 
Risk information and insurance: Essays in the memory of  Karl H. Borch, ed. Henri 
LoubergC. Boston: Kluwer Academic. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1953. Le r81e des valeurs boursikres pour la ripartition la meilleure 
des risques. Econometrie (Paris: Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique) 11  :41-47. 
. 1964. The role of  securities in the optimal allocation of risk bearing. Review 
of Economic Studies 31 (April): 91-96. 
. 1996. The theory of  risk-bearing: Small and great risks. Journal of  Risk and 
Uncertainty 12:102-111. 84  Christopher M. Lewis and Kevin C. Murdock 
Banz, R. W., and M. H. Miller. 1978. Prices for state-contingency claims: Some esti- 
mates and applications. Journal of Business 5 1 (October): 653-72. 
Berger, Lawrence A., J.  David Cummins, and Sharon Tennyson. 1992. Reinsurance and 
the liability crisis. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5:253-72. 
Bernknopf, Richard L., David S. Brookshire, and Mark Thayer. 1990. Earthquake and 
volcano hazard notices: An economic evaluation of changes in risk perceptions. Jour- 
nal of Environmental Economics and Management 18:35-49. 
Black, F., and M. Scholes. 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Jour- 
nal of Political Economy 8 1 (May-June):  637-54. 
Borch, K.  1974. The mathematical theory of insurance. Lexington, Mass.: Heath. 
Breeden, D. T.,  and R. Litzenberger. 1978. Price of state contingent claims in options 
prices. Journal of Business 5 1:621-51. 
Buchanan, J., and G. Tullock. 1966. The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univer- 
sity of Michigan Press. 
California Earthquake Authority (CEA). 1996. Summary of Plan of Finance I: Issuance 
of  taxable securities. New  York:  Morgan  Stanley;  Bear,  Steams; and  Goldman, 
Sachs, January. 
Cummins, J. David, Christopher M. Lewis, and Richard D. Phillips. 1997. Excess of 
loss reinsurance contracts  against catastrophic loss. In Alternative approaches to 
insurance regulation, ed. Robert Klein. Kansas City, Mo.: National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners. 
Debreu, J. 1959. Theory of value. New York: Wiley. 
Doherty, N., and S.  Tinic. 1981. Reinsurance under conditions of capital market equilib- 
English, James. 1996. Shareholder returns of catastrophe reinsurers. In Insurance in- 
Epstein, Richard A. 1996. Catastrophic responses to catastrophic risks. Journal of Risk 
Hakansson, N. H. 1976. The purchasing power fund: A new kind of financial intermedi- 
Han, Li-Ming, and Gene C. Lai. 1995. An analysis of  securitization in the insurance 
Hanington,  Scott  E.  1992. Rate  suppression.  Journal  of Risk  and  Insurance  59: 
Institute for Property Loss Reduction (IPLR).  1995. Homes and hurricanes: Public 
opinion concerning various issues relating to home builders, building codes, and 
damage mitigation. Boston. 
Insurance Information Institute. 1994. The  fact book: 1994 property casualty insurance 
facts. New York. 
Insurance Services Office (ISO).  1994. The impact of  catastrophes on property insur- 
ance. Insurance Services Issues Series. New York, May. 
. 1996. Managing  catastrophe  risk.  Insurance  Services  Issues  Series.  New 
York, May. 
Kane, Edward J. 1996. Difficulties in making implicit government risk-bearing partner- 
ships explicit. Journal of Risk and Un 
Klein, Robert W.  1995. Insurance regulat  a1 of Risk and Insurance 
62, no. 3:363-404. 
Kunreuther, Howard. 1996. Mitigating disaster losses through insurance. Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty 12:171-87. 
Lamb, Reinhold. 1995. An exposure-based analysis of property-liability insurer stock 
values around Hurricane Andrew. Journal of Risk and Insurance 62, no. 1  :  11 1-23. 
Lemaire, Jean. 1990. Borchs theorem: A historical survey of applications. In Risk, in- 
formation, and insurance: Essays in memory of Karl H. Borch, ed. Henri LoubergO. 
Boston: Kluwer Academic. 
rium: A note. Journal of Finance 36:949-53. 
dustry analysis. New York: J. P. Morgan securities, May. 
and Uncertain@ 12:287-308. 
ary. Financial Analysts Journal 32:49-59. 
industry. Journal of Risk and Insurance 62:286-96. 
185-202. 85  Catastrophic Risk Management 
Lewis, Christopher M., and Peter 0.  Davis. 1998. Capital market instruments for fi- 
nancing catastrophe risk: New directions? Working paper. Research Project on Cata- 
strophic Risk, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
Lewis, Christopher M., and Kevin Murdock. 1996. The role of government contract in 
discretionary reinsurance market for natural disaster. Journal of  Risk and Insurance 
63, no. 4567-97. 
Litzenberger, Robert H., David R. Beaglehole, and Craig E. Reynolds. 1996. Assessing 
catastrophe-reinsurance-linked securities as a new asset class. In Fixed income re- 
search. New York: Goldman, Sachs, July. 
Mandel, Brian K., and Henry Hayssen. 1995. The Northridge Earthquake: Special re- 
port. New York: Duff & Phelps Credit Rating, February. 
Marlett, David C., and Alan D. Eastman. 1998. The estimated impact of residual market 
assessments on Florida property insurers. Risk Management and Insurance Review 
2,  no. 1 (Summer): 37-49. 
Merton, Robert C. 1973. Theory of rational option pricing. Bell Journal of  Economics 
and Management Science 4 (Spring): 141-83. 
. 1990. Continuous-time finance. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 
Musgrave, R. A.,  and P.  B. Musgrave. 1976. Public finance in theory and practice. 
Tokyo: McGraw-Hill. 
Priest, George L. 1996. The government, the market, and the problem of catastrophic 
loss. Journal of  Risk and Uncertainty 12:219-37. 
Ross, S.  A. 1976. Options and efficiency. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (Febru- 
ary): 75-89. 
Shelor, Roger M., Dwight C. Anderson, and Mark L. Cross. 1990. The impact of the 
California earthquake on real estate firms’ sock value. Journal of  Real Estate Re- 
search 5:335-40. 
. 1992. Gaining from loss: Property-liability insurer stock values in the after- 
math of the 1989 California earthquake. Journal of  Risk and Insurance 5:476-88. 
Stigler, G. J.  1971. The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of  Economics 2 
(Spring): 3-2  1. 
Tversky, Amos, Shmuel Sattath, and Paul Slovic. 1988. Contingent weighting in judge- 
ment and choice. Psychological Review 95:37 1-84. 
US.  Bureau of the Census. 1994. Statistical abstract of  the United States, 1994. 113th 
ed. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Van Anne, Craig, and Thomas Larsen. 1993. Estimating catastrophe losses with com- 
puter models. Contingencies, MarcWApril. 
Comment  Peter Diamond 
This is an interesting paper, which does a good job of bringing existing theory 
to bear on these problems. I want to go over the same ground, organizing the 
material differently, and connecting with additional parts of  the literature, es- 
pecially the second-best literature. 
The paper identifies two potential public policy issues, one relating to the 
behavior of  individual propertyowners, the other to the behavior of  insurers 
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and reinsurers. The paper argues that we can successfully disconnect these two 
problems,  thinking about them separately. I agree, but,  as has already been 
mentioned by Steve Goldberg, some ways of approaching insurance provision 
will make worse the problems with the behavior of individual insurees. I will 
consider the two problems separately, assuming such a disconnect. 
Individual  behaviors  include decisions involving new construction (where 
to build, how to build), existing construction (whether to retrofit, whether to 
replace), and insurance (whether to smooth income across states of  nature). 
There are three models of individual behavior presented in different places in 
the paper. Model A has rational consumers responding  to incentives, such as 
the tax deductibility of large losses and disaster relief, that induce some ineffi- 
ciency. Model B has rational consumers suffering from inadequate information 
(presumably  resulting  from a high  cost of  obtaining that  information) and 
therefore making some decisions that are inefficient relative to a richer infor- 
mation set. Model C has irrational consumers in one of a variety of forms, such 
as those having very high implicit discount rates (coming from myopia, not 
just facing higher interest rates because of capital market imperfections) and 
those ignoring or undervaluing risks. 
If all consumers satisfied model A, then the focus would be on the incen- 
tives, recognizing the second-best issue that, with asymmetrical information, 
it is impossible either to provide insurance or to redistribute income without 
some distortions. The focus would be on finding the balance between providing 
more insurance and more redistribution and inducing larger deadweight bur- 
dens. While I do believe that many people are responsive to these incentives, 
I do not think that this is the whole story. 
If  all consumers satisfied model B, then the focus would be on providing 
information. However, I think that the evidence is overwhelming  that many 
people  do not successfully incorporate risk information into their decisions 
without experiences that affect responses. This has been explored extensively 
in the work of  Kunreuther (e.g., Kunreuther et al.). My first exposure to this 
was a presentation by two psychiatrists discussing decisions on smoking (Tam- 
erin and Resnik  1972). In addition to laying out a perspective on individual 
decision making, they cited the result that, “among the medical specialties, the 
most successful in quitting smoking are internists and radiologists, who have 
repeated contact with the disease consequences of smoking, and those with 
poor records are psychiatrists, who have the least direct contact with the se- 
quellae” (p. 82). Note that the presence of  irrationality  in assessing  risks is 
compounded by a “winner’s curse,” the tendency for those with the least con- 
cern about the risks to value new construction most highly. 
In order to address the issues raised by model C, we need to consider some 
forms of compulsion. Note also that, as long as we are not addressing all the 
issues raised by model C, we will have a need for institutional structures that 
will have to balance helping those satisfying model C with those satisfying 87  Catastrophic Risk Management 
model A, whose behavior is distorted by these measures. Note also that the 
issue arises, not only in high-risk areas, but also in low-risk areas and for prob- 
lems with uniform risks. For example, a recurrence of a major earthquake in 
New England, as occurred in the eighteenth century, would cause major dam- 
age. So too would the impact of  a meteor, such as the one that created the 
massive crater in Arizona.  How society should respond to the occurrence of 
such events, which are “unpredicted” as far as insurance preparation goes, de- 
pends on one’s view of society. With the American ethos, there is a strong sense 
that the government should help in such settings. 
The proposed compulsion analyzed in the paper is mandating insurance for 
new construction. The paper does not indicate whether this is just in areas 
considered high risk or in all parts of the country. Part of the motivation for this 
approach is to allow time for insurance capacity to grow along with mandated 
coverage. The paper assumes that such a mandate would result in efficient price 
signals  to builders.  But  this  seems overly  optimistic  to me. There will  be 
insurance-price variation with mitigation efforts, but the level may not be effi- 
cient. Some of this insurance cost will be bundled with the other costs of buy- 
ing new housing. Some of it may generate market power and thus redistribu- 
tion from home buyers. That in turn may be dissipated in overentry. A parallel 
with closing costs may be appropriate, with limited market discipline on levels. 
The paper contrasts assumed efficient pricing with the shortcomings of build- 
ing codes, recognizing both the problems of high uniformity in codes and the 
tendency to underenforce some of them. Once one also recognizes inefficien- 
cies in pricing,  we may  be in a setting best approached in the prices  versus 
quantities framework of Weitzman (1974). Indeed, since we will have codes 
no matter what we do about pricing, it may be best to think about having both 
tools in effect and to consider how to coordinate them. 
Another problem with Lewis and Murdock‘s approach is that it grandfathers 
existing construction. Given the presumed undervaluation of mitigation expen- 
ditures by the market, this results in an overvaluation of existing housing. This 
results in an inefficient incentive to build on vacant land rather than replace 
existing structures. How this relates to renovation depends on the rules cov- 
ering grandfathering. A natural solution to this problem is to expand the man- 
date for insurance to existing buildings slowly. This can be done at transaction 
time, as, for example, is being done in Massachusetts relative to septic systems. 
Of course, this has a distortionary effect on transactions. Another approach 
might be to have an analogue to the draft lottery, picking counties at random 
and extending the mandate slowly throughout the country. That would produce 
a dream instrument for econometricians. 
We might also consider more use of tort liability of builders along the lines 
of  products  liability, although such an approach will not  solve this problem 
by itself. 
I turn now to the second problem-that  of the behavior of insurers and re- 88  Christopher M. Lewis and Kevin C. Murdock 
insurers. The discussion considers the cost of reserves-basically  a cost of 
liquidity. Implicit in some discussions is an assumption that the social cost of 
liquidity differs from its private cost. This may well be the case, but we do not 
have good equilibrium models of liquidity, models with capital market imper- 
fections, with which to evaluate the implications of this perspective for insur- 
ance. There are two implications of low reserves-an  insolvency risk for insur- 
ees and guaranty funds and a slow growth of  capacity after a catastrophe and 
therefore a limited availability of insurance during such an adjustment period, 
as has been examined in the work of Gron (1990). Again, we would need a 
model of capital market imperfections to examine how to respond to this prob- 
lem. Intertemporal  sharing of risks involves substituting consumption  in one 
year for that in a later year, something that takes place through changes in the 
level of investment. The link between this and reserves runs primarily through 
atemporal distribution of risks. Analysis of this issue may parallel that of the 
national debt, where the intertemporal effects come from the effect of alterna- 
tive decisions affecting the national debt on investment decisions. 
There are two ways to go for tapping into conditional funds in order to speed 
the growth of capacity after a catastrophe. One is to have conditional payments 
(a form of  insurance), and the other is to have conditional loans (a form of 
committed lines of credit). Which approach would do better at tapping addi- 
tional sources of funds I do not know, but it would be good to analyze this 
formally. On the one hand, lines of credit involve putting less at risk by the 
new sources of funds. On the other hand, it may take having more at risk to 
create the incentives to get involved in supplying this market. 
As a matter of equilibrium, it is also important to recognize that increasing 
the availability of conditional funds is likely to reduce the level of insurance- 
company reserves, so one needs to evaluate the net effect relative to whatever 
other incentives are associated with increasing such fund availability. 
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Comment  Paolo M. Pellegrini 
I read the Lewis and Murdock paper with great interest. My comments are in 
the  spirit of  stimulating further thought and research  as they reflect limited 
data and analysis. 
First, I would like to offer some introductory thoughts about the two propos- 
als contained in the paper. Concerning Lewis and Murdock’s first proposal, 
mandatory disaster insurance for new homes, I agree with their view that home 
buyers in disaster-prone areas need guidance to internalize risk. At a minimum, 
some form of disaster-hazard disclosure should be required. I doubt whether 
mandatory insurance is socially or politically viable. However, it would not be 
unreasonable to condition federal postdisaster assistance to ex ante insurance 
requirements. Also, the tax deductibility of disaster-insurance premiums could 
be a powerful incentive for individuals to make responsible risk-management 
decisions. 
Concerning the second proposal in Lewis and Murdock, a federal govem- 
ment excess-of-loss (XOL) program, I believe that such a program is neither 
justified nor effective. The industry’s $200 billion capital is subject to volatility 
far greater than its catastrophe exposure in the $25 billion excess of $25 billion 
layer covered by the proposed XOL program. Moreover, such exposure is un- 
likely to be significantly correlated to the industry’s other sources of volatility, 
and, therefore, removing it would not reduce the industry’s overall volatility by 
any noticeable amount. ’ Individual companies that do need catastrophe protec- 
tion, perhaps as a result of sound strategies based on geographic focus, would 
benefit only marginally from the XOL program because, as discussed in Ma- 
jor (chap.  10 in this volume), index-based hedges (such as the XOL program 
would be) present unacceptable basis risk. 
The insurance  industry  and  the  capital  markets  can address the  nation’s 
property-catastrophe risk-transfer needs without the direct involvement of the 
federal government. The only policy initiative that I would support is the trans- 
fer of regulatory authority from the states to the federal government. State in- 
surance departments lack the degree of coordination required to regulate the 
inherently suprastate process of redistributing property-catastrophe risk. Con- 
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1. As a hypothetical example, let us assume that the insurance industry’s annual results have a 
standard deviation equal to 15 percent of the industry’s $200 billion capital, or $30 billion (this is 
comparable to the volatility of the S&P 500 and lower than the volatility of many individual insur- 
ance stocks). By some estimates, the annual losses associated with the XOL program (the XOL 
losses) have an expected value of $ I25 million and a standard deviation of $1.25 billion. Assuming 
no correlation between XOL losses and industry results excluding XOL losses, the industry stan- 
dard deviation excluding XOL losses would be $29.97 billion. Assuming a 50 percent correlation 
(a figure far above any reasonable expectation), the industry standard deviation excluding XOL 
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sequently, they  tend  to  impose market-inefficient  constraints  on  insurance 
companies’ risk selection and pricing as well as on their financial and invest- 
ment policies. 
I  offer  the  following  explanatory  model  for  the  current  property- 
catastrophe-insurance- and reinsurance-capacity shortfall. 
Because of regulatory constraints, primary insurers cannot control their risk 
exposure directly, through selective underwriting. Although they could control 
their risk exposure indirectly, through reinsurance, they cannot pass through 
the cost of reinsurance to policyholders. Therefore, they are forced to resort to 
market exit as their primary risk-management tool. 
Reinsurers face their own constraints, as they lack opportunities to diversify 
geographically their concentrated exposures to zones such as Florida and Cali- 
fornia. Consequently, they can offer incremental coverage in such zones only 
at prices that primary insurers can hardly afford.2  Lewis and Murdock advocate 
intertemporal diversification as a possible s~lution.~  A much simpler solution 
is diversification through  investments4 The obvious impediment  to  such  a 
solution is that regulators and rating agencies would not allow it. Even more 
important,  the  syndicated,  “consensus-pricing”  structure  of  the  property- 
catastrophe-reinsurance market would not allow it. 
Despite much effort, the capital markets have failed to fill the gap so far. 
There is no obvious explanation. Perhaps the securities offered are too risky 
for the fixed-income buyers and too anemic for the hedge funds, the two pri- 
mary marketing targets to date. Perhaps they are simply not attractive, given 
the market’s current perception  of  potential risk and return. With respect to 
risk, investors are skeptical about the predictive power of simulation models, 
given their poor performance in events such as the Los Angeles Earthquake. 
With respect to return, investors perceive a capped upside that will not affect 
overall portfolio results substantially. Consequently, they are reluctant to make 
the intellectual investment required to understand the new securities. Although 
most industry observers agree that securitization will ultimately succeed, the 
timetable is unclear. 
The following are possible suggestions to reduce dislocation in the property- 
catastrophe-insurance and -reinsurance markets. 
2. As a hypothetical example, let us assume that a reinsurance company has a cost of capital of 
25 percent, provided that the standard deviation of its return on capital not exceed 20 percent. Let 
us assume further that it can underwrite treaties with the same limit in n zones not subject to a 
common peril. In addition, let us assume that each treaty has an expected value and a standard 
deviation of losses equal to 3 and 12 percent of the treaty limit, respectively, and that investments 
yield a risk-free rate of 5 percent. The breakeven rate on line (i.e.,  premium divided by  limit) 
would be 15 percent for n = 1, 11.5 percent for n = 2,9.0 percent for n = 4, and 7.2 percent for 
n = 8. 
3. Assuming that losses in different years are independent of each other, underwriting n years 
(for a fixed multiyear premium) would have the same diversification effect as underwriting n zones. 
4. Using the same assumptions as were used in n. 2 above, except for an investment yield of 20 
percent with a standard deviation of  15 percent, the break-even rate on line for n = 1 would be 
7.5 instead of  15 percent. 91  Catastrophic Risk Management 
Since federal postdisaster assistance is a given, property-catastrophe insur- 
ance should be regulated by the federal government with the objective of re- 
ducing unintended cost shifting and cross-subsidization. Clearly, this is not an 
option that is available in the near future. 
Most of what can be done immediately involves reinsurance and securitiza- 
tion, which are regulated only indirectly by individual states. 
Reinsurers have already accomplished a lot in terms of underwriting meth- 
ods and standards. However, there could be beneficial changes. The property- 
catastrophe reinsurance market should move beyond the syndicated, consen- 
sus-pricing format to accelerate further the process of  underwriting-quality 
improvement. Even today, few treaties are underwritten on the basis of  the 
best information already available, namely street address data, because few 
reinsurers have the capability to analyze such data. If  individual reinsurers 
were able to underwrite treaties in their entirety, the pressure on the technology 
laggards would be much greater. 
In addition, reinsurers should satisfy the riskheturn equation, not by chasing 
marginally priced, nonaccumulating business, but by changing financing and 
investment policy. If  a reinsurer’s volatility is 15 or 20 percent as a result of 
underwriting property-catastrophe  business, its cost of  capital will be com- 
mensurate, perhaps also 15 or 20 percent or higher. A 5 percent yield on invest- 
ments financed with equity creates enormous deadweight cost and imposes 
rate-on-line hurdles that cannot be sustained by the ceding companies. A focus 
on business with a low expected loss ratio, even at the expense of geographic 
diversification, is a superior strategy, provided that the reinsurer (1) maintains 
a conservative ratio of premiums  and underwriting  exposure to capital and 
(2) allocates its assets to higher-return, even though higher-volatility, invest- 
ments. 
The role of  the capital markets needs to be reevaluated in the light of the 
experience of the last three years. Clearly, unlike  securitization, the capital 
raising efforts on behalf of the Bermuda property-catastrophe-reinsurance spe- 
cialists were an unqualified success. 
The issue of whether there is a need for additional reinsurance capital is a 
conundrum. Reinsurers complain about their inability to write enough ade- 
quately priced business, an igdication that there is too much capital. Yet insur- 
ers complain about their inability to buy enough reasonably priced coverage, 
an indication that there is too little capital. 
The implication of my previous comments is that there is too much capital 
available to underwrite diversifiable risks and too little to underwrite undiversi- 
fiable risks. Investor-return requirements to underwrite undiversifiable risks, 
however, will be comparable to those for privately placed risky assets. 
Therefore, the immediate focus of capital markets intermediaries should be 
to raise equity for a new class of highly capitalized, single-cedent reinsurers, 
able to achieve return enhancement and risk diversification internally, through 
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The competitive advantages of these new entities are significant. They will 
be able to address any insurance risk, regardless of accumulation, and at any 
time (as opposed to the standard inception dates of  1 January, 1 April, and 1 
July). They will be able to perform superior underwriting due diligence and, 
therefore, price risk more accurately. They will be able to offer transparent 
security-the  reinsured will know as much about the reinsurer as the reinsurer 
itself (today, the security of property-catastrophe reinsurers, or the lack thereof, 
is difficult to assess). 
Over  time,  single-cedent  reinsurers  could  become increasingly  debt  fi- 
nanced, driving down the cost of capital and risk-transfer pricing to the theoret- 
ical level that would be demanded by risk-neutral investors, that is, expected 
value of losses with no premium for volatility. Initially, however, they will reap 
excess returns comparable to those reportedly enjoyed by Berkshire Hathaway 
in connection with its treaty with the California Earthquake A~thority.~ 
5.  According to some estimates, the California Earthquake Authority and Berkshire Hathaway 
have entered into a treaty providing, on an annual equivalent basis, for a rate on line of approxi- 
mately  10 percent, against losses with an expected value of  between 0.5 and  1 percent and a 
standard deviation of between 2.5 and 5 percent (the standard deviation estimate reflects the four- 
year intertemporal diversification inherent in the treaty). 